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KEITH S. ROSENN*
Procedural Protection of Constitutional
Rights in Brazilt
Brazil has developed one of the most complex systems of judicial
review in the world. In addition, it has developed a wide variety of
constitutional actions for the purpose of protecting the huge number of
constitutional rights conferred by its lengthy Constitution. In theory,
constitutional rights can be protected in ordinary actions. Because or-
dinary actions typically take a great many years to resolve in Brazil,
the framers of the 1988 Constitution, building on Brazil's prior consti-
tutions and foreign models, constitutionalized a wide array of
procedural devices to try to assure that the huge number of individual,
social and economic rights created by the current Constitution are ef-
fectively protected by the judiciary. This Article explores the
complexities of these constitutional procedures, how they have worked
or not worked in practice, and the problems that they have created for
the Brazilian Judiciary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Gaps between the law on the books and the law in action are
evident in all societies. In Latin America, particularly in the area of
constitutional law, that gap has loomed particularly large. Noting
that between independence and 1959, Latin American republics had
adopted a total of 186 constitutions, one scholar observed: "Nowhere
are constitutions more elaborate and less observed."' More recently,
Miguel Schor stated: "Constitutional law in Latin America has an al-
most surreal quality ... ."2 Many factors help explain why it has been
so difficult to implant successful constitutionalism in Latin America.3
One factor has been the region's slowness to develop effective proce-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
t DOI 10.5131/AJCL.2010.0033
1. J. Lloyd Mecham, Latin American Constitutions-Nominal and Real, 21 J.
POLITIcs 258 (1959).
2. Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America,
41 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1, 5 (2006).
3. These many factors are explored in Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitu-
tionalism in the United States and Its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 20-30 (1990); Schor, supra note 2, at 14-35.
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dural devices for ensuring compliance with constitutional
guarantees. The framers of the nineteenth century Latin American
constitutions, influenced by the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man, explicitly set forth essential human rights. Their hope was that
if fundamental rights were listed in the constitution, both the govern-
ment and the people would naturally respect those rights.4 After it
became apparent that constitutional rights were being honored only
in the breach, certain Latin American jurists realized that they
needed to borrow or create speedy procedural remedies because ordi-
nary judicial remedies, which required protracted litigation, were
ineffective to protect fundamental rights.
In 1830, while still a constitutional monarchy, Brazil became the
first Latin American country to adopt the Anglo-American institution
of habeas corpus. Since then, Brazil has gradually created a panoply
of special procedural institutions for the protection of constitutional
rights. Brazil's current Constitution, adopted in 1988 as a reaction to
twenty-one years of military dictatorship during which constitutional
rights were widely disrespected, explicitly guarantees a vast number
of individual, social, and economic rights. It also constitutionalizes
many rules of private and administrative law, particularly in the
area of labor law, tax law, foreign investment, and social security.
The Constitution contains a great many programmatic norms that
require enactment of complementary legislation for their implemen-
tation. In a bold attempt to assure that these constitutional rights do
not exist solely on paper, as had been the case under prior constitu-
tions, the framers created a broad array of constitutionalized
procedural devices to enable individual litigants, certain elected offi-
cials, and a variety of civic and political organizations to try to secure
effective judicial protection of these rights. While these procedural
mechanisms have significantly improved protection of constitutional
rights, a substantial gap between important rights on paper and in
practice persists.
Brazil's 1988 Constitution has established an extensive and com-
plicated system of judicial review. It is a hybrid system, combining a
decentralized, incidental form of judicial review modeled after the
United States with a centralized, abstract form of judicial review
modeled after that of European countries like Germany and Italy.
The constitutionality of any federal, state, or municipal law or decree
may be challenged incidentally in ordinary litigation before any state
or federal court.5 A constitutional issue can be raised by any party
4. Heitor Fix Zamudio, Latin American Procedures for the Protection of the Indi-
vidual, 9 J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTs 60-61 (Dec. 1968).
5. Although Article 97 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution provides that tribunals
may declare laws or normative acts unconstitutional only by an absolute majority
vote of their members, a provision that has been in Brazilian Constitutions since
1934, the case law and doctrine agree that single judges may exercise the power of
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(including a third party), the Public Ministry, 6 or even by the court
itself.7 Typically, a party raises a constitutional question in ordinary
litigation by means of a pleading called an exception or by way of
defense. Usually, a party does not attack the constitutionality of a
law or decree directly. Instead, parties typically attack the constitu-
tionality of an act or conduct based upon the offending law or decree.8
The Constitution also specifically confers standing upon a limited
group of officials and organizations to challenge the constitutionality
of any law or decree in the abstract in four different forms of actions
that can be brought directly before the Supreme Federal Tribunal
(STF), Brazil's highest court, or, in certain cases, before the Tribunals
of Justice, the highest state courts.9 In addition, the constitutionality
of proposed and enacted constitutional amendments can be chal-
lenged before the STF.10
judicial review. RE 89.553, Mar. 24, 1981 (STF 1st Chamber, Rep. Rafael Mayer), 97
R.T.J. 1191, 554 REV. TRIB. 253 (1981); GILMAR FERREIRA MENDES, INOC9NCIA MAR-
TIRES COELHO & PAULO GUSTAVO GONET BRANCO, CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL
1068 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter MENDES ET AL.].
6. The Public Ministry is an autonomous civil law institution that has no real
counterpart in common law countries. It combines aspects of the public prosecutor
with responsibility for defending the legal order. It is headed by the Procurator Gen-
eral of the Republic, who sits with and renders his opinion to the Supreme Federal
Tribunal but does not vote. The Public Ministry may intervene in all cases involving
status of persons, guardianship, marriage, and any matter of public interest. He must
render an opinion in cases involving abstract challengers to constitutionality and has
standing to bring such actions. See BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1988, arts. 127-30
[hereinafter CONsT. OF 1988].
7. CLPMERSON MERLIN CLPVE, A FISCALIZACAQAO ABSTRATA DA CONSTITUCION-
ALIDADE NO DIREITO BRASILEIRO 98 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter CLEtVE]. Permitting the
court to declare statutes unconstitutional sua sponte has little to commend it. The
court does not have the benefit of briefing and argument by the parties and unneces-
sarily exercises the power of judicial review. Brazil has had at least one unfortunate
experience with the STF resolving constitutional questions that are not raised by the
case before it. In 1996, soon after Brazil adopted a badly needed comprehensive arbi-
tration statute, Minister Sepillveda Pertence, in a case involving recognition of a
foreign arbitral award where both parties had specifically agreed to arbitrate after
the dispute had arisen, used the occasion to declare unconstitutional sections of the
Brazilian Arbitration Law that permitted enforcement of arbitration clauses agreeing
in advance to arbitrate on the untenable theory that such clauses violate art. 5
(XXXV), which prohibits laws from excluding any injury or threat to a right from
review by the Judiciary. Agravo Reg. Sentenga Estrangeiro No. 5206-7, Oct. 10, 1996.
See Arnoldo Wald, Patrick Schellenberg & Keith S. Rosenn, Some Controversial As-
pects of the New Brazilian Arbitration Law, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 223, 228-
29 (2000). Fortunately, his erudite but misguided decision was ultimately overturned
by a majority of his colleagues. Judgment of Dec. 12, 2001, D.J.U. Apr. 30, 2004. In
the five year interim, however, critical provisions of the new Arbitration Law were
under a constitutional cloud.
8. CLkVE, supra note 7, at 91-92.
9. CONsT. OF 1988, supra note 6, arts. 102 (I)(a), (q), and §1; art. 103. See CL9VE,
supra note 7, at 391-406.
10. Art. 60 § 4 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution expressly prohibits any consti-
tutional amendment aimed at abolishing federalism, periodic elections, separation of
powers, and individual rights and guarantees. The STF has permitted challenges to
the constitutionality of proposed constitutional amendments by means of writs of se-
curity (see section IV infra), but has restricted standing only to members of Congress.
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As a general rule, lower court decisions on constitutional ques-
tions may be appealed all the way to the STF. The 1988 Constitution
grants the STF jurisdiction to hear by extraordinary appeal (recurso
extraordindrio) any decision in sole or ultimate instance that is con-
trary to the Constitution, declares a treaty or federal law
unconstitutional, or upholds a law or act of a local government
against a constitutional challenge." The STF also has jurisdiction to
hear ordinary appeals; all writs of habeas corpus, writs of security,
habeas data, and mandates of injunction denied by superior tribu-
nals; and cases involving political crimes.12 In addition, as will be
seen in Sections IX to XII, the STF has original jurisdiction to decide
four types of direct constitutional challenges, as well as a variety of
other matters, such as trying ordinary criminal charges against
members of Congress and a variety of other officials.
The STF's jurisdictional parameters are far too broad. Although
it is meant to function primarily as a constitutional court, the STF is
also forced to decide a great many non-constitutional matters, many
of which involve trivial or frivolous claims or issues that it has al-
ready decided.' 3 It still lacks a procedural device similar to the U.S.
Supreme Court's writ of certiorari that would enable the STF to pick
and choose the cases that it wishes to hear or a true stare decisis
doctrine that could eliminate relitigation of issues that the STF has
already settled. As a result, its workload is overwhelming. In 1987,
the year prior to adoption of the current Constitution, the STF de-
cided 20,122 cases. Between 2000 and 2010, the STF decided an
average of 110,720 cases per year.
There are only eleven ministers on the STF, and these caseloads
would be impossible if the full Tribunal or even its five-member
panels heard each case. The STF's statistics are somewhat mislead-
ing, however, because the great bulk of its cases are resolved by the
decision of a single minister. A large number are dismissed by the
President of the STF prior to distribution for lack of jurisdiction, un-
The cases are collected in Lufs ROBERTO BARROso, 0 CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCION-
ALIDADE NO DIREITO BRASILEIRo 44-45, n.112 (2004). The STF has heard numerous
challenges to promulgated constitutional amendments, almost always through direct
actions of unconstitutionality. The cases are collected in MENDES ET AL., supra note 5,
at 1029, n.128.
11. CONsT. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 102 (III). The extraordinary appeal stems
from the writ of error in the U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789. It entered Brazilian law in
Decree 848 of Oct. 24, 1890, which structured the federal judiciary. Since then, the
extraordinary appeal has been incorporated into every subsequent Brazilian constitu-
tion. ADA PELLEGRINI GRINOVER, ANTONIO MAGALHAEs GOMES FILHo & ANTONIO
SCARANCE FERNANDES, REcURSOS NO PROCESSO PENAL 202 (7th ed. 2011) [hereinafter
GRINOVER ET AL.].
12. CONsT. OF 1988, supra note 6, at art. 102 (II).
13. In 1997, Sepillveda Pertence, former President of the STF, stated that re-
search indicated that ninety percent of the appeals to the STF raised issues that had
already been decided by the STF. 1 REVISTA CONSULEx 10 (No. 3, Mar. 1997).
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timeliness, frivolity, or failure to present an issue of general
repercussion. Cases that make it past this initial screening are ran-
domly assigned to a single minister (member) who acts as the
reporter (relator) and who is responsible for studying the file and an-
alyzing the issues.1 4 The reporter has the authority, acting alone, to
dismiss cases that clearly should not be heard or which present
claims contrary to the STF's settled case law or samula (a form of
precedent discussed in Section VIII (4) infra). The reporter on his or
her own also can reverse an appealed decision that is manifestly con-
trary to the STF's settled case law or sgmula.15 Cases that survive
this dual screening process are then submitted either to the full court
or a panel, depending upon the type of case, accompanied by the re-
porter's written statement of the case and vote. While another
minister can stop the proceedings by asking to review the file, this
happens infrequently; generally, the other members of the full court
or panel concur with the vote of the reporter. Thus, last year, only
2.45% (2,546 cases) of the STF's 103,806 decisions were rendered by
the full tribunal, and only 8.46% (8,788 cases) were decided by one of
the STF's two panels. The remaining 89% (92,472 cases) were re-
solved by the unilateral decision of either the reporter or the
president or vice-president of the STF.16
Efforts at judicial reform are underway in Brazil; they seek grad-
ually to reduce the enormous caseloads of Brazil's highest courts. A
2004 constitutional amendment has authorized the STF to refuse to
hear certain types of appeals because they lack general repercus-
sions. The same amendment has conferred power on the STF to
create binding precedent on constitutional issues. Even though these
reforms do not go far enough, they are definitely improving the
situation.
II. HABEAS CORPUS
The oldest and most basic procedural institution for the protec-
tion of constitutional rights is habeas corpus. Habeas corpus crept
into Brazilian law through the back door of the Penal Code of 1830,
which criminalized failure to issue or to delay issuance of writs of
habeas corpus in cases in which they should have been granted or
rearrested someone freed by habeas corpus, as well as the failure to
comply with the writ or failure to help an official comply with the
14. Only in a few types of cases is a second member of the STF, called the re-
viewer, designated to assist the reporter and check his or her work. Reviewers are
designated in rescissory actions, extraordinary criminal appeals, criminal revisions,
original criminal actions, and declarations of suspension of rights. Regimento Interno
do STF, art. 23.
15. Id., art. 21 §§ 1 and 2.
16. STF 2010 Relat6rio de Atividades, available at http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/
cms/sobreSTFConhecaSTFRelatorioanexoRelatorio2010.pdf.
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writ.1 7 The procedures governing issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus were not actually regulated until promulgation of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1832.18
The Brazilian writ of habeas corpus quickly grew to be far
broader than its common law antecedent. Because it was the only
summary procedure available to protect constitutional rights, Brazil-
ian jurists expanded habeas corpus to try to protect a variety of rights
that had nothing to do with physical liberty.19 For example, habeas
corpus was utilized to annul a legislative act that cancelled a stu-
dent's matriculation in a public school.20 Because the Brazilian
courts were overwhelmed with habeas corpus petitions, a constitu-
tional amendment was adopted in 1926 that restricted the use of
habeas corpus to actual or threatened interferences with one's "lib-
erty of locomotion." 21
Brazil's present Constitution guarantees that "habeas corpus
shall be granted whenever a person suffers or is threatened with suf-
fering violence or coercion in his freedom of movement through
illegality or abuse of power."22 This guarantee should be read to-
gether with several other complementary constitutional guarantees:
(1) No one shall be arrested unless in flagrante delicto or by
written and substantiated order of a competent judicial
authority, except for a military offense or a specific mili-
tary crime, as defined by law. 2 3
(2) The arrest of any person and the place where he can be
found shall be communicated immediately to the proper
judge and to the arrested person's family or to a person
designated by him.2 4
(3) Judicial authorities shall direct immediate release of
those illegally arrested. 25
17. C6digo Criminal do Impirio do Brasil, arts. 183-87 (1830).
18. Arts. 340-55. These provisions were added to by Law 2.033 of 1871.
19. Phanor Eder, Habeas Corpus Disembodied: The Latin American Experience,
in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAw; LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
HESSEL E. YNTEMA 463, 465-69 (Kurt H. Nadelmann, Arthur T. von Mehren & John
N. Hazard eds., 1961).
20. GRINOVER ET AL., supra note 11, at 270.
21. Amendment of Sept. 3, 1926, replacing art. 72 § 22 of the 1891 Constitution,
47 REV. FOR. 620, 627 (1926).
22. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5 (LXVIII). This constitutes an individual
guarantee that cannot be altered by a subsequent constitutional amendment. Id. at
art. 60, §4 (IV). The Constitution also provides that habeas corpus and habeas data
proceedings, as provided by law, are free of charge. Id. at art. 5 (LXXVII). Art. 5 of the
Law on Judicial Costs, Law No. 9.289 of July 4, 1996, reiterates that habeas corpus
and habeas data proceedings are free.
23. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5(LXI).
24. Id. at art. 5(LXII).
25. Id. at art. 5(LXV).
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(4) No one shall be taken to prison or held therein when the
law permits provisional liberty, with or without bond.2 6
The writ of habeas corpus has a very summary procedure and
occupies the highest preference on courts' dockets. Because of the
brevity of the procedure, habeas corpus cannot be utilized to deter-
mine controverted issues of fact, such as whether the accused's
conduct constituted excusable behavior under the Penal Code or to
determine which crime the prisoner should be charged with.27 There
is no state action requirement for habeas corpus; it can be brought to
challenge constraints on liberty from either public or private actors. 28
Nor is there a statute of limitations for habeas corpus or res judicata
estoppels. Habeas corpus will not lie, however, to challenge the legal-
ity of a sentence after it has been served or after the criminal
sanction has been extinguished.29
Habeas corpus does not have its own regulatory statute; instead,
it is governed by provisions of an obsolete Code of Criminal Procedure
adopted during the Vargas dictatorship and misplaced under the gen-
eral title of appeals. According to the statute, habeas corpus should
be granted whenever an individual's liberty to come and go is con-
strained or imminently threatened with constraint by any state or
private actor (1) without just cause, (2) when one is imprisoned for
longer than permitted by law, (3) when the authority that ordered the
constraint lacked jurisdiction to do so, (4) when the reason for the
constraint has ceased, (5) when one is denied release on bail in cases
where the law permits release, (6) when the proceedings are clearly
null and void, or (7) when the offense is no longer punishable.30
Habeas corpus is one of the few constitutional actions in which
third party standing is permitted. While it is normally brought by the
individual whose liberty of movement is impaired or threatened with
impairment, habeas corpus can be filed by any person, whether or not
a lawyer, or by the Public Ministry, on behalf of another.31 Indeed,
habeas corpus can even be granted ex officio. 3 2 The Internal Rules of
the STF provide that habeas corpus may not be conceded, however, if
the petition is not authorized by the person whose liberty is
affected.33
26. Id. at art. 5(LXVI).
27. MENDES ET AL., supra note 5, at 522.
28. GRINOVER ET AL., supra note 11, at 282-83.
29. STF, Sdmula No. 695. The sdmula is discussed infra in Section VIII.B. It is a
black letter rule of law that need not but almost always is followed by all Brazilian
courts.
30. Code of Criminal Procedure, Decree-Law No. 3.689 of Sept, 8, 1941, art. 648.
31. Id. at art. 654.
32. Id. at 654 § 2.
33. STF, Regimento Interno, art. 192, sole paragraph.
2011]1 1015
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
In practice, habeas corpus is utilized much more broadly than
the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates. Habeas corpus is routinely
invoked to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal inquiry by a
person required to testify, to challenge an indictment, to challenge a
jury verdict or a criminal sentence. 34 Moreover, habeas corpus can be
employed as a means of protecting the right of a full defense in all
criminal proceedings.35 For example, it can serve as a means of ob-
taining discovery in criminal cases. In a recent case involving its
original jurisdiction, the STF issued a preliminary injunction in a
habeas corpus proceeding ordering the release of secret wiretaps to
the attorney of a member of Congress under criminal investigation so
that his client could have the benefit of a full defense. 36 Habeas
corpus cannot, however, be used to challenge a criminal fine.3 7 Nor
may it be used to challenge the legality of wiretapping or the break-
ing of bank secrecy unless the petitioner can show that the purpose of
the disregard for privacy is to obtain evidence for a criminal
prosecution.38
Although the Code of Criminal Procedure is silent on the subject,
habeas corpus can be utilized to attack the constitutionality of a law.
The STF has construed its habeas corpus jurisdiction broadly, per-
mitting habeas to be utilized to contest the constitutionality of a
statute that actually had little to do with freedom of movement. In
the case of Vieira Netto,39 the STF declared unconstitutional Article
48 of the National Security Law, which prevented anyone accused of
a national security violation from working. In order to find that this
was properly a case for habeas corpus, the STF held that the statute's
prohibition on working constituted an interference with the rights of
the petitioners, a group of bankers, businessmen, and a lawyer, to
come and go to their offices. 40 More recently, however, the STF has
retreated from this strained interpretation, holding that the an in-
dicted public official removed from his office by a decision of a Special
34. MENDES ET AL., supra note 5, at 522-23.
35. LAERCIO PELLIGRINO, 0 HABEAS CORPUS: TEORIA, PRATICA, JURISPRUDtNCIA IX
(1990).
36. Benidito Dias de Carvalho, HC No. 88.520-9 Amapd, (STF en banc, Original
Rep. CArmen Licia, Rep. for Decision, Marco Auralio, Nov. 23, 2006).
37. STF, SAmula Nos. 693. Law No. 9.268 of 1996 amended Art. 51 of the Crimi-
nal Code to prohibit conversion of an unpaid fine into a prison sentence.
38. MENDES ET AL., supra note 5, at 524-25.
39. H.C. No. 45.232, Feb. 21, 1968, 44 R.T .J. 322 (1968).
40. For a more recent decision in which the STF utilized a habeas corpus action to
declare a statute unconstitutional, see Max Baumert Filho, H.C. No. 77724 (STF en
banc, Nov. 4, 1998, Rep. Marco Aur6lio). There are, however, decisions of lower courts
holding that habeas corpus cannot be used to attack the constitutionality of a law
because the procedure is too summary. E.g., Jurandyr Fonsi, HC No. 122.048, 469
REV. TRIB. 291 (Trib. Just. Sdo Paulo, Feb. 12, 1974, Rel. Mendes Franga); H.C. No.
94116, D.J. May 14, 1997, p. 9.378 (Trib. Just. D.F., Mar. 20, 1997, Rep. L6cio
Resende), criticized as incorrect in LENIO Luiz STRECK, JURISDICAO CONSTITUTIONAL E
HERMEN8UTICA 462-63 (2d ed. 2004).
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Organ of Brazil's second highest court, the Superior Tribunal of Jus-
tice (STJ), cannot use habeas corpus to challenge his removal because
there was no interference with his liberty of locomotion.41
The Code of Criminal Procedure is also silent with respect to the
right of the courts to issue a preliminary injunction in habeas corpus
cases. Paradoxically, this lacuna was first filled by military tribunals
at a time when Brazil was under military dictatorship. In 1964, the
Superior Military Tribunal confirmed issuance of a preliminary in-
junction preventing a military officer from requiring a civilian to
testify at a military inquiry on a subject that had nothing to do with
the military.42 Soon thereafter, the STF began issuing preliminary
injunctions in habeas corpus cases,4 3 and it is now common practice
for Brazilian courts to do so. 4 4
Despite Brazil's long established constitutional guarantee of
habeas corpus, a great many prisoners remain confined in a hugely
overcrowded and horrendous prison system 45 when they should be at
large. Pretrial detainees make up forty-four percent of Brazil's prison
population of nearly 500,000, one of the largest in the world. Brazil's
badly overcrowded prisons would be much worse were it not for the
failure to incarcerate an estimated 60,000 convicted fugitives from
justice.46 In the past year, at the initiative of the National Council of
Justice, groups of judges drawn from different areas were assembled
to review the status of prisoners. Between August 2008 and the end
of December 2010, the National Council of Justice announced that
after reviewing 218,401 cases, these ad hoc groups of judges, called
mutirdes, had freed 27,791 wrongfully imprisoned detainees. In addi-
tion, the mutirdes found that 49,586 prisoners were being held at
inappropriate security levels.47
41. HC-AgRg 84.326/PE, Didrio de Justiga of Oct. 1, 2004 (STF, Rep. Ellen Gra-
cie); HC 84.816/PI, Didrio de Justiga of May 6, 2005 (STF, Rep. Carlos Velloso).
42. The lawyer for the petitioner was Arnoldo Wald, one of Brazil's most distin-
guished jurists, and the case is set out in Arnoldo Wald, As Origens da Liminar em
Habeas Corpus no Direito Brasileiro, 747 REV. TRIB. 803, 804-06 (1998).
43. Id. at 803, 806.
44. JoAo ROBERTO PARIZATTO, Do HABEAS CORPUs: DouTRINA, PRATICA FORENSE E
JURISPRUDRNCIA 21-23 (1991); Gamil Foppel & Rafael Santana, Habeas Corpus, in
AOES CONSTITUCIONms 27, 57-60 (Fredie Didier Jr. ed., 3d ed. 2008).
45. See Katherine Haas, Inhumane, Ineffective, Intolerable: Brazil's Prison Sys-
tem, Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Memorandum No. 1, Aug. 26, 2010, at
1-2, available at www.coha.org/inhumane-ineffective-intolerable-brazil%e22%80%99
s-prison-system/ [hereinafter Haas Report].
46. Int'l Bar Assoc., Human Rts. Inst., One in Five: The Crisis in Brazil's Prisons
and Criminal Justice System 16-17 (Feb. 2010) [hereinafter Int'l Bar Assoc. Report].
This estimate divides the total number of unserved sentences by five on the unverified
assumption that each fugitive probably has about five unserved sentences. Id. at 17.
47. Luiz Fldvio Gomes & Roberta Calix Coelho Costa, Justiga Criminal: Sele-
tividade e Impunidade. Mutirdes do CNJ Liberam 33 Presos por Dia, 16 REVISTA Jus
NAvIGANDI (Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://jus.uol.com.br/revista/texto/18789.
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These recent investigations reveal that roughly one-fifth of all
pretrial detainees in Brazil are being wrongfully imprisoned despite
the theoretical availability of habeas corpus.48 There are a number of
reasons for this malfunction. Even though the Constitution guaran-
tees the right to pretrial release when the law permits,49 in practice
Brazilian judges overuse pretrial detention to try to combat the popu-
lar perception that the Judiciary is soft on crime and routinely
releases common criminals. One study found that Brazilian judges
routinely order pretrial detention for those accused of petty theft,
even though this is a minor offense for which pretrial release is au-
thorized.50 A second reason is that despite a constitutional right to
counsel,51 the Public Defender's Office has neither the funding nor
the staff to provide legal counsel for the vast numbers of accused per-
sons who need legal assistance.52 According to a study conducted in
the State of Sio Paulo in 1999-2000, defense lawyers never even
sought pretrial release in ninety-eight percent of the cases in which
their clients were arrested in flagrante delicto for robbery.53 A third
reason is bureaucratic incompetence. Prisoners frequently become
lost in the system, serving more time in pretrial detention than the
maximum sentence if convicted, or having been convicted, serving
more time than their sentences. 54 A fourth reason is the staggering
slowness of the Brazilian criminal justice system. The mutirdes dis-
48. A year earlier, the Director of Brazil's Penitentiary System (DEPEN), Mauri-
cio Kuehne, estimated that about thirty percent of all Brazilian prisoners should be at
liberty. CPI SISTEMA CARCERARIO 221 (Biblioteca Digital da C~mara dos Deputados,
Centro de Documentagdo e Informagio, 2009), available at http://bd.camara.gov.br.
[hereinafter CPI CARCERARIO].
49. CONsT. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5 (LXVI) provides: "No one shall be taken to
prison or held therein when the law permits provisional liberty, with or without
bond."
50. Int'l Bar Assoc. Report, supra note 46, at 8. A legislative inquiry into the
prison system found that poor defendants routinely are sentenced to prison for theft
of food or articles of clothing. Even though art. 5 (LXVII) of the 1988 Constitution
prohibits civil imprisonment for debt, the CPI found one female prisoner in Porto
Velho whom a civil judge had sentenced to prison for being two months behind on her
rent. CPI CARCERARIO, supra note 48, at 49, 309. The STJ recently released on habeas
corpus a prisoner who had been sentenced to seven years of prison plus 319 fine-days
for stealing three used undershorts and a pair of socks from a backyard. HC 201325,
May 3, 2011 (STJ, 6th Chamber, Rep. OG Fernandes).
51. CONsT. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5 (LXIII) provides: "One under arrest shall
be informed of his rights, including the right to remain silent, and shall be assured
assistance of his family and a lawyer."
52. Int'l Bar Assoc. Report, supra note 46, at 48-50; Haas Report, supra note 45,
at 2-3.
53. Int'l Bar Assoc. Report, supra note 46, at 9.
54. The mutirdes found more than 250 cases in which prisoners were still impris-
oned, some for more than four years, after having served their sentences. Conselho
Nacional de Justiga, Relat6rio Anual 168 (2009) [hereafter CNJ Relat6rio 20091. The
STF recently issued a preliminary injunction in a habeas corpus appeal ordering the
immediate release of a defendant who had been detained for more six-and-a-half
years awaiting retrial after his conviction had been reversed on appeal. H.C. No.
106.435-MC Sao Paulo, Nov. 29, 2010 (STF, Rep. Min. Celso de Mello).
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covered detainees that had been confined as long as fourteen years
awaiting trial, as well as detainees confined as long as three years
simply waiting to be charged with an offense by the prosecutor.55
Habeas corpus is widely perceived as a privilege freely available
to the rich and politically well connected. It is exceedingly rare for
people who can afford a high powered lawyer to spend time in a Bra-
zilian prison. The Brazilian Constitution provides, somewhat
illogically, that "No one shall be considered guilty until his criminal
conviction has become final and nonappealable."5 6 When accused of
crimes, the wealthy and the politically connected almost invariably
manage to avoid pretrial detention. Brazilian law confers on a vast
number of persons the right to avoid pretrial detention with common
criminals. This privilege of special prison, often at one's own home,
extends to all elected officials, members of the police and military,
any criminal justice system employee, judges, prosecutors, diplomats,
members of the antitrust board, members of the clergy, civil servants,
those who have served on juries, pilots, firemen, directors and admin-
istrators of unions and business syndicates, elementary and
secondary school teachers, and anyone with a university degree.57
Moreover, the right to special prison lasts until one's conviction be-
comes final and nonappealable.58 Wealthy defendants usually
manage to manipulate the seriously overburdened criminal justice by
filing dilatory motions that postpone trial for many years. If ulti-
mately convicted, they appeal their convictions ad infinitum while at
liberty.59 In the rare event that a judge orders their confinement,
habeas corpus functions extremely well, perhaps too well, for the rich
and the powerful.60
Members of Congress historically have had little need for habeas
corpus because the Brazilian Constitution confers both the privilege
55. CNJ Relat6rio 2009, supra note 54, at 169.
56. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5(LVII).
57. Luls FERNANDO DE MORAES MANZANO, CURSO DE PROCESSO PENAL 434-37
(2010).
58. Id. at 434.
59. CPI CARCERARIO, supra note 48, at 47-49. For example, Regivaldo Pereira
Galvao, one the of ranchers charged with ordering the assassination of the American
nun, Dorothy Stang, in 2005 remained at liberty after securing a writ of habeas
corpus until his eventual trial in 2010. Shortly after conviction, he was again released
upon habeas corpus pending the outcome of his appeal. The STF has been reversing
the lower courts and releasing upon habeas corpus persons convicted of serious crimes
like rape until the judgment becomes final and nonappealable. E.g., H.C. 91676/RJ,
Rep. Ricardo Lewandowski, STF en banc, Dec. of Feb. 12, 2009, 31 LEX STF, no. 367,
pp. 311-54 (2009).
60. One of the more recent notorious examples is that of Daniel Dantas, formerly
President of Banco Opportunity, whose arrest on fraud charges was twice ordered by
a federal judge in Sdo Paulo in 2008. On each occasion, Dantas' attorneys bypassed
the intermediate courts of appeal and obtained a writ of habeas corpus directly from
the President of the Supreme Federal Tribunal. David Fleischer, Brazil, in COUNTRIES
AT THE CROSSROADS 2010, at 13 (Freedom House, 2010), available at www.freedom
house.org/uploads/ccr/country-7788-9.pdf.
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of parliamentary immunity6 ' and the right to be tried exclusively by
the overburdened STF.62 Although criminal proceedings have been
filed against 152 members of Congress, many of whom face multiple
accusations and some of whom even have multiple convictions in
state courts,63 between September 1988 and April 2010, the STF
failed to convict any member of Congress. In a signal that the days of
Congressional impunity may be numbered, between May and Sep-
tember 2010, the STF somehow found time to convict three members,
although none was actually sentenced to serve hard jail time.64 Even
more surprisingly, in October 2010, a panel of the STF convicted and
sentenced Natan Donadon, a deputy from the State of Rod6nia, to
prison for a substantial term.65 Despite this conviction, Donadon is
currently back in Congress. In December 2010, a member of the STF
issued a preliminary injunction overriding a decision of the Superior
Electoral Tribunal and allowing Donadon to retake his seat in Con-
gress pending the outcome of his request for clarification of the STF's
decision that convicted him.66
61. From the date of investiture, members of Congress may not be arrested except
in flagrante delicto for a non-bailable crime, in which case the respective chamber
decides whether the accused should be imprisoned. CoNsT. OF 1988, supra note 6, art.
53 § 2. If a member of Congress is accused of a crime after investiture, the respective
chamber may suspend the criminal proceedings any time prior to a final decision. Id.
at art. 53 § 3.
62. Id. at art. 53 § 1. This provision makes no practical sense. With an annual
caseload exceeding 100,000, the STF is institutionally incapable of functioning as a
trial court.
63. For a list of all charges against Congressional members from STF records as
of May 20, 2010, see "A Lista dos Parlamentares Processados, por Estado," available
at http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/noticia.asp?codcanal=21&cod-publicacao=
29847.
64. On May 13, 2010, Jos6 Gerado Arruda Filho became the first Congressman to
be convicted by the STF, which sentenced him to two years and two months of com-
munity service. On May 20, 2010, CAssio Taniguchi became the second Congressman
to be convicted by the STF for diverting funds from the Inter-American Development
Bank when he was mayor of Curitiba. He was sentenced to six months in jail, but
actually will serve no time because of the running of the limitations period. On Sep-
tember 27, 2010, Deputy Jos6 Fuscaldi Cesilo (Tatico) became the third Congressman
to be convicted by the STF but the first to be sentenced to prison, albeit soft core. The
STF sentenced Tatico to seven years of a semi-open prison regime (at liberty by day,
prison at night) for misappropriating income tax payments his firm had collected from
employees.
65. On October 28, 2010, the STF convicted Deputy Natan Donadon, who had just
been re-elected despite two convictions in the state courts of Rond6nia and had re-
signed the day before the judgment to try to send the case back to Rond6nia. The STF
sentenced Donadon to thirteen years and four months in prison, initially in a closed
regime.
66. Agdo Cautelar 2.763 Rond6nia, Dec. 16, 2010 (STF, Rep. Celso de Mello). The
preliminary injunction suspended for one year a decision of the Superior Electoral
Tribunal that had refused to register Donadon's candidacy for reelection because of
the Law of the Clean Slate. Minister Celso de Mello relied upon an illogical constitu-
tional provision which states that "no one shall be considered guilty until his criminal
conviction has become final and nonappealable." CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5
(LVII).
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In June 2010, a popular initiative led to the enactment of a con-
troversial statute called the Law of the Clean Slate. 67 This law
prohibits any candidate from running for political office for eight
years if he or she has been convicted of certain crimes. But this prohi-
bition applies only if one of the following three criteria are met: (1)
the conviction has become final and non-appealable, (2) the convic-
tion was rendered by a collegiate tribunal, or (3) the candidate
resigned a mandate to avoid its cancellation. 68 Initially, the constitu-
tionality of the Law of the Clean Slate as applied to the 2010
elections was upheld by a short-handed and evenly divided STF.69
However, on March 23, 2011, after appointment of a new minister,
the STF reversed its earlier decision and, by a vote of 6-5, held that
the Law of the Clean Slate could not constitutionally be applied to the
2010 elections because of the one-year delay rule set out in Article 16
of the Constitution.70
III. HABEAS DATA
Brazil was the first country in Latin America to create a procedu-
ral institution called habeas data to enable persons to know what
information about them exists in data banks and to correct misinfor-
mation.71 The right of habeas data first appeared in Brazil's 1988
Brazilian Constitution in the following terms:
67. Complementary Law No. 135 of June 4, 2010. This law was only the second
statute to result from a popular initiative.
68. The eight-year period of ineligibility runs from the date that the sentence is
completed.
69. The issue originally came before the STF in an appeal taken by Joaquim
Roriz, ex-governor of the Federal District. The STF, which had only ten members be-
cause of a retirement, deadlocked five-to-five. Roriz then withdrew his candidacy in
favor of his wife. Noticias STF, Sept. 29, 2010, available at www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/
verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo. The same issue was then presented in RE
63.1102 brought by Jader Barbalho, whose election as a senator was cancelled by the
Superior Electoral Tribunal for violation of the Clean Slate Law. After the same 5-5
tie, the STF, by a 7-3 vote, decided to break the tie by resorting to art. 205, sole para-
graph, of its Internal Rules, which provides that the constitutionality of the statute
should be upheld in case of a tie. Noticias STF, Oct. 28, 2010.
70. RE 633703, Dec. Mar. 23, 2011 STF en banc, Rep. Gilmar Mendes. Art. 16 of
the CONsT. OF 1988, supra note 6, as modified by Amendment No. 4 of Sept. 14, 1993,
provides: "A law altering the electoral process shall enter into force on its publication
date and shall not apply to elections that occur within one year from the date it enters
into force."
71. Although not called habeas data, similar remedies were created in Article 35
of the Portuguese Constitution of 1976, Article 105(b) of the Spanish Constitution of
1978, the U.S. Freedom of Information Act of 1974, and the French Law on Informat-
ics and Liberties of January 6, 1978. Arnoldo Wald, 0 Habeas Data na Lei 9.507/97,
in HABEAs DATA 13 (Teresa Arruda Alvim Wambier ed., 1998).
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Art. 5 LXXII- habeas data shall be granted:
a) to assure knowledge of personal information about the pe-
titioner contained in records or data banks of government
agencies or entities of public character;
b) to correct data whenever the petitioner prefers not to do so
through confidential or administrative proceedings[.]
In the draft version of the Constitution, habeas data could be brought
only by Brazilian citizens, and the writ could be used against both
private and public data banks. In the final version, the limitation to
citizens was deleted, as was the application of habeas data to private
data banks. 72 Congress did not enact a statute regulating habeas
data until 1997. In the interim, lawyers and courts utilized the proce-
dure enacted for the writ of security (see section IV infra).73
The 1997 statute implementing the writ of habeas data confers
the additional remedy of adding an annotation stating that certain
personal data is under dispute. 74 This statute also made clear that an
entity with a register or data bank is public in character if the data is
being transmitted or could be transmitted to third parties.75 Habeas
data actions have priority over all other actions with the exception of
habeas corpus and writs of security.76 Yet habeas data may be
brought only by persons with a direct interest in the challenged
records or data banks, which means that it cannot be used to try to
find the whereabouts of relatives or friends who disappeared during
the military dictatorship or by journalists seeking access to facts the
government prefers to keep secret. Because it is a summary proce-
dure without an opportunity for resolving factual disputes, the writ of
habeas data only applies to situations where a petitioner can attach
documentary proof to his petition showing the plain incorrectness of
the record or data or where there is no real factual dispute about the
inaccuracy. If there is a serious dispute of fact, the writ of habeas
72. Caio Tdcito, Judicial Control of Administrative Action in Brazil, in A PANo-
RAMA OF BRAZIMAN LAw 27, 47 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith S. Rosenn eds., 1992).
73. Law 8.038 of May 28, 1990, art. 24, sole parargraph provides that until spe-
cific legislation is enacted, the courts should apply to the writ of habeas data the
norms of the writ of security to the extent they are appropriate. Brazilian doctrinal
writers and case law deemed the constitutional provision creating habeas data to be
self-executing and used the procedures governing the writ of security. Cassio
Scarpinella Bueno, Habeas Data-Efeitos da Apelagdo, Liminar e Suspensdo de
Sentenga, in HABEAS DATA, supra note 71, at 33, 34-37. The courts still resort to the
norms governing the writ of security to fill lacunae in the 1997 implementing statute.
74. Law No. 9.507 of Nov. 12, 1997, art. 7(111).
75. Id. at art. 1. A data bank is not subject to habeas data if it is for the exclusive
use of the entity that maintains it. Prior to Law 9.507, case law held that a private
commercial association that publicly divulges information about debtors is subject to
a habeas data action. Ap. 165.159-1/3, 686 REV. TRIB. 109 (2d Chamber, Tribunal of
Justice of Sao Paulo, May 5, 1992, Rep. Costa de Oliveira).
76. Law No. 9.507, art. 19.
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data will not lie.7 7 Nor will habeas data lie unless the petitioner can
show that the entity administrating the data bank refused a request
to produce the contested data,78 refused to rectify or annotate it, or
allowed fifteen days to pass without a response.79
In 1990, Brazil enacted the Code of Consumer Protection, 0
which contains an article specifically granting consumers access to
information about themselves in both private and public data banks.
Article 43 of the Consumer Protection Code provides that without
prejudice to the provisions of Article 86, the consumer shall have ac-
cess to, and a right to correct any inaccuracies in, all personal and
consumer information about him that is stored in commercial regis-
tries and data banks, as well as to sources of that information.
Section 4 of Article 43 makes clear that "data banks and registries
relating to consumers, credit protection and similar services are con-
sidered entities of public character." Unless solicited by the
consumer, opening a file or register about a consumer must be com-
municated to him in writing, and registers or files of consumer data
may not contain negative information dating back more than five
years about the consumer. 81 Article 86 originally provided that con-
sumers could bring writs of security and habeas data to protect rights
provided by the Consumer Protection Code. The President, however,
vetoed Article 86 on the ground that:
The actions of the writ of security and habeas corpus are de-
signed, by their nature, for defense of subjective public
rights, and therefore, have as their principal objective acts of
public agents. Their extension or application to other situa-
tions or legal relations is incompatible with their
constitutional nature.82
77. HELY LOPES MEIRELLES, ARNOLDO WALD & GILMAR FERREIRA MENDES,
MANDADO DE SEGURANCA E AQOES CONSTITUCIONAis 305, n.5 (32d ed. 2009) [hereinafter
MEIRELLES ET AL.I.
78. Szimula No. 2 of the STJ provides: "Habeas data (CF, art. 5, LXXII, letter a)
will not lie if there has not been a refusal of information on the part of the administra-
tive authority." This case law rule, issued prior to the enactment of Law 9.507 of Nov.
12, 1997, is inconsistent with the statute.
79. Law 9.507 of Nov. 12, 1997, art. 8 (1,11, & III). There are cases, however, that
require the petitioner to prove that he or she has requested the data bank to produce,
rectify or annotate the data. See Fernando Sacco Neto, 0 Habeas Data, a Samula 2 do
STJ e o Art. 80, Pardgrafo (nico, I, II e III, da Lei 9.507/1997, in PROCESSO E CON-
STITUUAO: ESTUDOS EM HOMENAGEM AO PROFESSOR JOS9 CARLOS BARBOSA MOREIRA 41,
44-45 (Luiz Fux, Nelson Nery Jr. & Teresa Arruda Alvim Wambier eds., 2006).
80. Law No. 8.078 of Sept. 11, 1990.
81. Section 5 of Article 43 prohibits credit protection systems from furnishing any
information that might prevent or make more difficult new access to credit after the
statute of limitations has run on collecting of a consumer debt.
82. Quoted in EDUARDO GABRIEL SAAD, COMENTARIOS AO CODIGO DE DEFESA DO
CONSUMIDOR 664 (5th ed. 2002).
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Despite the presidential veto of Article 86, a substantial overlap ex-
ists between habeas data and the Consumer Protection Code.
In comparison with other constitutional writs, cases involving
habeas data are seldom litigated. Most cases involving allegedly in-
correct data are brought under the Consumer Protection Code
against banks and credit agencies. These actions frequently utilize
the procedure set out in Law 9.507, but unlike habeas data cases, the
plaintiff can obtain both pecuniary and moral or non-pecuniary
damages.8 3
IV. THE WRIT OF SECURITY
To fill the gap left when habeas corpus was cut back to actual or
threatened interference with locomotion, Brazil's 1934 Constitution
created a new and broad constitutional remedy called the writ of se-
curity (mandado de seguranga), often mistranslated as a writ of
mandamus. The writ of security is a unique summary constitutional
remedy that combines aspects of the Anglo-American writs of manda-
mus, injunction, prohibition and quo warranto, as well as the motion
for summary judgment. The writ of security can be brought by an
individual or legal entity to protect a "liquid and certain right" unpro-
tected by habeas corpus or habeas data against actual or threatened
illegality or abuse of power. Legal entity is a broad concept which
includes even governmental entities, and like Mexican amparo ac-
tions, the writ of security action is sometimes brought by one
governmental agency against another. The requirement that the
right protected be "liquid and certain" means that the petitioner's
right must be manifestly clear on the basis of documents attached to
the petition, unless a needed document is in the hands of the respon-
dent authority.84 Because it entails such a summary procedure, the
writ of security will lie only when there is no need for an evidentiary
hearing to determine the facts.
Unlike habeas corpus, the writ of security contains a state action
requirement. The writ can only be brought against a public authority
or an agent of a legal entity performing public duties.85 The new Writ
of Security Law clarifies the public function concept by explicitly pro-
viding that "for the purposes of this Law, representatives or organs of
political parties and administrators of autarchic entities, as well as
directors of legal entities or individuals exercising governmental pow-
ers shall be equated with authorities, but only with respect to the
83. Code of Consumer Protection, art. 6 (VI); RIzzATwo NuNEs, CURSO DE DIREITO
DO CONSUMIDOR 572-73 (3d ed. 2008).
84. MEIRELLES ET AL., supra note 77, at 34-35; MENDES ET AL., supra note 5, at
533, n.1. If the respondent refuses to produce the needed document in its power, the
judge will presume the necessary documental proof in favor of the petitioner. MEIREL-
LES ET AL., supra note 77, at 35, n.25.
85. CONsT. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5(LXIX).
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exercise of such powers."86 The writ of security has a preferential
place on courts' dockets and a summary procedure. The action must
filed within 120 days after the petitioner has knowledge of the chal-
lenged act in question.87 In cases of urgency, the petition can be
transmitted by fax or other electronic communication, to be followed
by a hard copy within five days.88 The authority has only ten days
after service to render information to the court.89 If the authority
wishes to present a defense, the matter will be sent to the Public Min-
istry, which must proffer its opinion within ten days, a period that
may not be extended.90 After that time, the proceeding will be con-
cluded regardless of whether the Public Ministry has rendered an
opinion, and the judge has thirty days to render an opinion.91 In prac-
tice, however, the procedure is rarely this rapid but usually takes
several months to be concluded. What is frequently critical in writ of
security cases is the issuance of a preliminary injunction suspending
the execution of the challenged act or procedure until the matter is
ultimately decided. This preliminary injunction can be issued ex
parte at any time to make the writ effective, but the judge has discre-
tion to condition the injunction upon the petitioner's making a
deposit with the court or posting a bond to indemnify the authority. 92
A preliminary injunction may not be issued against an order to pay
taxes, to secure delivery of imported merchandise, reclassification or
concession of salary increases or other advantages to civil servants.93
The writ of security also may not be used to challenge the consti-
tutionality of a law unless the law is self-executing.94 Normally, one
can challenge only the illegality or abuse of administrative actions
implementing a statute. Nor can the writ of security be invoked to
challenge an administrative act from which one may take an admin-
86. Law 12.016 of Aug. 7, 2009, art. 1 § 1. Brazil has a variety of public, private
and mixed enterprises performing public services. An autarchy is an autonomous ser-
vice, created by law, with its own legal personality, patrimony and income, to carry
out a public service activity. Some perform commercial activities, such as the Federal
Savings and Loan; some regulate commerce, and some control professional activities,
like the Federal Bar. A public enterprise is a legal entity with its own patrimony and
income, whose capital is entirely owned by the Federal Government or its indirect
administrative entities. Such enterprises are created by law to carry out en-
trepreneurial activities of the government, such as telecommunications. Mixed-
economy companies are corporations for the exercise of commercial activity whose
capital is partly public and partly private, but a majority of the voting shares is owned
by the Federal Government either directly or indirectly.
87. Law No. 12.106 of 2009, art. 23.
88. Id. at art. 4.
89. Id. at art. 7(I).
90. Id. at art. 12, heading.
91. Id. at art. 12, sole paragraph.
92. Id. at art. 7(111).
93. Id. at art. 7 § 2.
94. Sdmula No. 266 of the Supreme Federal Tribunal provides: "The writ of se-
curity will not lie against a law in the abstract." See MEIRELLES ET AL., supra note 77,
at 37.
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istrative appeal that suspends enforcement of the act. And it may not
be employed to challenge a final judicial decision from which one may
take an appeal that suspends enforcement of the decision.95 How-
ever, regardless of the availability of an appeal to a higher level in
the hierarchy, the writ of security can be used to challenge omissions
by an authority, provided the writ is brought within 120 days after
judicial or extrajudicial notification of the omission.96
The 1988 Constitution created a collective writ of security, which
combines the writ with a class action. Such a collective writ of secur-
ity may be brought either by any political party represented in the
National Congress or by any union, professional organization or le-
gally organized association operative for at least one year to defend
the liquid and certain rights of its members or associates.97 Not until
2009, when it enacted a new Writ of Security Law,98 did Congress
finally regulate the collective writ of security.
In general, the same procedures govern both the collective and
the individual version. But the collective writ of security can also in-
clude both diffuse interests, such as the environment, and collective
interests, such as determination of a wage increase for a category of
civil servants. The filing of a collective writ of security does not pre-
vent individual actions against the same authority and the effects of
resjudicata of the collective action do not affect the individual actions
unless they were suspended pending the outcome of the collective
proceedings. If it is successful, the collective action has res judicata
effects that benefit only members of the class. If it fails, individual
actions may later be brought against the same respondent.99
The writ of security is a widely used speedy check on governmen-
tal abuse of power or disregard for constitutional or legal provisions.
It can function as a positive or negative injunction, compelling an au-
thority either to perform or to cease performing an act. Moreover, the
judge has the power to issue an ex parte preliminary injunction to
preserve the status quo. Given the long delays associated with ordi-
nary litigation, this preliminary injunction is frequently of critical
importance. After a writ of security is granted, the norm may not be
enforced against the party or group that filed the action. Non-parties,
however, must bring their own actions if the authority persists in ap-
plying the controverted norm to them. The writ of security is a
favorite device for challenging taxes and judicial decisions from
which an appeal does not have a suspensive effect. In recent years, it
95. Law 12.016 of 2009, art. 5 (I), (II) and (III).
96. Id. at art. 5, sole paragraph.
97. Id. at art. 5(LXX).
98. Law 12.016 of Aug. 7, 2009. This statute revoked the prior Writ of Security
Law, Law No. 1.533 of Dec. 31, 1951.
99. EDUARDO ARRUDA ALvim, MANDADO DE SEGURANQA NO DIREITO TRIBUTARIO
387-88 (2d ed. 2010).
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has also become a popular means for enforcing one's constitutional
right to health by securing a judicial order mandating that state or
federal health agencies pay for the petitioners' HIV-AIDS drugs, ex-
pensive operations or unusual treatments.10 0
V. THE MANDATE OF INJUNCTION
Many rights created by the 1988 Constitution are not self-execut-
ing but require implementing legislation or regulations.' 0 '
Recognizing that legislative or bureaucratic inertia may create a seri-
ous obstacle to the protection of fundamental constitutional rights,
the Congress that drafted the 1988 Constitution also created a new
form of action called the mandate of injunction (mandado de injun-
qdo). This is somewhat of a misnomer because it has nothing to with
the Anglo-American injunction. The Constitution provides that "the
mandate of injunction shall be issued whenever lack of regulatory
provisions makes the exercise of constitutional rights and liberties
and prerogatives inherent in nationality, citizenship, or sovereignty
infeasible."102 The mandate of injunction is a form of action designed
to goad Congress or regulatory agencies into acting, as well as to pre-
serve constitutional rights until implementing legislation or
regulations are adopted. It does not apply to all legislative or regula-
tory omissions, but is restricted to those that affect fundamental
constitutional rights. 0 3 It will not lie unless the time period set out
in the Constitution for enactment of the necessary implementing leg-
islation or regulation has expired. Moreover, enactment of the needed
legislation will moot any pending mandate of injunction action. Even
presentation of a bill containing the needed implementing legislation
to Congress may prevent issuance of the mandate of injunction.104
100. The number of these cases has grown exponentially since 1991. They are al-
most always successful and have had huge impacts on the health care budgets of the
federal and state governments. See Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Between Usurpation
and Abdication? The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil and South Africa, Aug.
20, 2009, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458299; Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Right to
Health Litigation in Brazil, an Overview of the Research, May 15, 2009, http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1426011. The political backlash from this litigation has led to de-
mands for legislation to curb the right to health litigation. It has also resulted in the
STF's convoking a public forum in April and May 2009 to discuss what to do about the
problem. The transcript of the debate is available at http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/
verTexto.asp?servico=processoAudienciaPublicaSaude.
101. According to the calculation of the Minister of Justice when the Constitution
was promulgated, Congress needed to issue 285 ordinary laws and 41 complementary
laws to effectuate constitutional provisions. Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's New Constitu-
tion: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J.
COMP. L.773, 778 (1990). The number of needed laws is actually greater because of the
numerous amendments.
102. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5 (LXXI).
103. MEIRELLES ET AL., supra note 77, at 289.
104. DIRLEY DA CUNHA JVNIOR, CONTROLE JUDICIAL DAS OMISSOES DO PODER PUB-
LICO 537 (2d ed., 2008). However, in MI 361-RJ, D.J.U. June 17, 1994, p. 15.707 ( Rep.
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It is sheer irony that Congress has not yet enacted implementing
legislation for the mandate of injunction. In 1989, the STF held that
the constitutional provision establishing the mandate of injunction is
self-executing, and that the procedural regime for the writ of security
is applicable by analogy.105 The following year Congress endorsed the
position taken by the STF. 0 6 Like the writ of security, the mandate
of injunction can be brought as a class action by the Public Ministry,
any political party represented in Congress, union or syndical organi-
zation, or any legally constituted association to protect the interests
of their members or associates. Unlike the writ of security, however,
preliminary injunctive relief will not be granted in mandate of injunc-
tion actions.107 Nor can the mandate of injunction be used to
challenge the constitutionality of legislation.
Brazil's highest court has struggled with the question of what
should be the appropriate remedy in mandate of injunction cases. In
1990, in what is usually termed the "leading case" on the subject, the
STF took the position that the principle of separation of powers pre-
vented the courts from supplying the needed implementing
legislation or regulation as well as from ordering another branch of
government to supply it. The only relief that could be granted was to
warn the legislative body that it was not in compliance with the con-
stitutional requirement, 108 a position that rendered the mandate of
injunction virtually useless if the legislature persisted in its inaction.
In 1991, for the first time in a mandate of injunction action, the
STF gave Congress a specific time period to enact the legislation
needed to make a constitutional right effective. Article 8 § 3 of the
Transitional Constitutional Provisions Act provides that reparations
shall be granted to all citizens prevented from practicing professions
by resolutions adopted by the military government in accordance
with a law adopted by Congress within one year after the Constitu-
tion went into force. When Congress failed to enact the necessary
legislation, citizens who suffered damages from the military's actions
filed mandate of injunction actions. The STF gave Congress a period
of forty-five days in which to enact the needed law, plus fifteen days
for the necessary presidential signature. 09 When Congress ignored
Sepfilveda Pertence), the STF permitted the mandate of injunction even though a bill
providing the implementing legislation was pending in Congress.
105. MI 107 QO-DF, Nov. 23, 1989 (133 R.T.J. 11 (1990)) (STF en banc, Rep.
Moreira Alves).
106. Law 8.038 of May 28, 1990, art. 24, sole paragraph, provides that until spe-
cific legislation is enacted, the norms of the writ of security, to the extent appropriate,
apply to the mandate of injunction.
107. MI 670/ES, D.J. May 24, 2002 (STF, Rep. Mauricio Correa), stating: "The case
law of this Court is firmly established in the sense that the nature of the mandate of
injunction is incompatible with the concession of a preliminary injunction."(citing
cases).
108. MI 107-DF, D.J.U. of Sept. 21, 1990 (STF, Rep. Moreira Alves).
109. MI 283, D.J.U. Nov. 14, 1991 (STF, Rep. Sepfilveda Pertence).
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the timetable, the STF permitted citizens injured by the military gov-
ernment to seek indemnification by ordinary damage actions without
any further notification to Congress. 110 Unfortunately, this solution
means that the affected litigants had to wait for five years because of
congressional inaction, but also that they will have to wait more than
another five to ten years for the courts to resolve their constitutional
claims through ordinary litigation, plus up to an additional ten years
for the Federal Government to pay any judgment. But when charita-
ble entities sought a tax exemption pursuant to Art. 195 § 7 of the
Constitution," 1 the STF held that if Congress failed to adopt the
needed complementary law within six months, the petitioning chari-
table institutions would automatically receive the tax exemption. 112
In 2007, the STF turned the mandate of injunction into a much
more viable institution by overtly engaging in provisional legislation.
Article 9 of the Constitution guarantees the right to strike, and § 1
states that the law shall define which services or activities are essen-
tial and shall provide for meeting essential needs. Article 37 (VII)
provides that the right to strike shall be exercised in the manner de-
fined by a specific law. In 1989, Congress adopted a General Law on
Strikes, which regulated the right of employees in the private sector
to strike, including those employees providing essential services, but
Congress failed to regulate specifically the right of civil servants to
strike.1 13 In 1996 and 2002, the Supreme Federal Tribunal rejected
mandate of injunction actions on behalf of civil servants to ensure
their right to strike on the ground that specific legislation needed to
be enacted.114 In 2007, after nearly twenty years of Congressional
procrastination, the STF decided that the time had come to fill the
legislative vacuum on its own, albeit provisionally. That year the STF
granted three mandates of injunction permitting civil servants to
strike even though Congress had failed to enact the needed legisla-
tion. The Tribunal resolved the problem of the legislative omission by
borrowing provisions of the General Law on Strikes, to the extent
they fit, ignoring the lack of specific provisions applying to civil
servants."15
110. MI No. 355, 200 R.D.A. 234 (1994) (STF, Rep. Celso de Mello).
111. Art. 195 § 7 provides: "Charitable entities of social assistance complying with
the requirements established by law are exempt from social security assessments."
112. MI No. 232, D.J.U. Mar. 27, 1992 (STF, Rep. Moreira Alves). Cf. MI No. 679,
D.J.U. Dec. 17, 2002 (STF, Rep. Celso de Mello).
113. Law No. 7.783 of June 28, 1989.
114. MI No. 20, D.J.U. Nov. 22, 1996 (STF, Rep. Celso de Mello); MI 485, D.J.U.
Aug. 23, 2002 (STF, Rep. Mauricio Corria), and MI 585, D.J.U. Aug. 2, 2002 (STF,
Rep. Ilmar Galvio).
115. MI No. 670-ES (Nov. 25, 2007) (STF en banc, Rep. Mauricio Corria), 207
R.T.J. 11 (No. 1, 2009); MI No. 708, D.J.U. Nov. 25, 2007 (STF, Rep. Gilmar Mendes);
MI No. 712, D.J.U. Oct. 25, 2007 (STF, Rep. Eros Grau).
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More recently, the STF continued on the same path in mandate
of injunction actions brought to ensure rights to a special retirement
regime for civil servants pursuant to Article 40 § 4 of the Constitu-
tion. Again, the exercise of this right required a complementary law
that was never enacted. In a series of cases reflecting its new orienta-
tion, the STF granted mandates of injunction and ordered application
of the special retirement provisions contained in Article 57 of the gen-
eral Social Security Law, Law No. 8.213 of July 24, 1991, by
analogy.116 The approach of the STF is similar to the familiar civil
law technique of filling legislative lacunae by borrowing analogous
statutory provisions. It does not manufacture the missing norm out of
whole cloth but merely broadens the scope of an existing norm in or-
der to ensure that constitutional rights can be enjoyed despite
legislative inertia. It remains to be seen what will happen when there
is no analogous norm to borrow.
VI. THE POPULAR ACTION
A creation of the 1934 Constitution," 7 the popular action is a
device that allows any Brazilian citizen to bring suit for the sole pur-
pose of annulling acts or contracts injurious to the patrimony of any
public entity. The action has no real standing requirements. It can be
brought by any citizen merely in his capacity as a voter, regardless of
whether he or she has any personal stake in the matter. Unlike other
constitutional actions, the purpose of the action is to vindicate the
collective interest in honest government and indemnification of losses
to public patrimony rather than to vindicate individual rights and
freedoms. The action must allege the illegality or illegitimacy of an
act or contract, and that this impugned act or contract has caused
injury to the public patrimony.118
In 1965, the popular action was regulated by a statute that
treats these suits as ordinary civil actions but with a more rigorous
time frame."19 Once served, defendants have twenty days, renewable
for a like period, in which to respond. Judges are obligated to file
their decisions within fifteen days of receiving the documentary re-
cord. The statute tends to discourage popular actions by requiring
plaintiffs to pay initial costs, the defendant's attorney's fees if the de-
fendant prevails, and to pay ten times the costs of the suit if the
action is deemed frivolous.120 The action must be brought within five
116. MI No. 755, decision of May 12, 2009, D.J.U. May 19, 2009 (STF, Rep. Eros
Grau); MI No. 721, D.J.U. Nov. 30, 2007 (STF, Rep. Marco Aurdlio); MI No. 758,
D.J.U. Sept. 26, 2008 (STF, Rep. Marco Aurdlio; MI No. 795, decision of Apr. 15, 2009,
D.J.U. May 22, 2009, 210 R.T.J. 1070 (STF en banc, Rep. Carmen Lficia).
117. CONST. OF 1934, art. 113(38).
118. MEIRELLLES ET AL., supra note 77, at 151.
119. Law No. 4.717 of June 29, 1965.
120. Id. at arts. 10 and 13.
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years from official publication of the challenged act. 121 As in writ of
security cases, preliminary injunctions can be issued here as well. 122
Also like the writ of security, the popular action may not be used to
challenge the constitutionality of a law in the abstract. 123 It Will,
however, lie to challenge self-executing laws that have immediate
consequences and are thus the functional equivalents of administra-
tive acts, such as a statute that expropriates a specific property.
The 1988 Constitution expanded the popular action to include
not only acts that injure the public patrimony, but also those that
cause injury to administrative morality (i.e., corruption), the environ-
ment, and historic and cultural patrimony.124 The Public Ministry
can bring a popular action, defend it, or assist the plaintiff, but in any
case it must participate in the proceedings.
If the action is finally decided on the merits, the decision has
erga omnes effect, whether the action is successful or not. This is be-
cause the decision becomes res judicata, and a similar popular action
cannot be brought by another citizen. Only if it fails for insufficient
proof may another popular action be brought on similar facts. 125
VII. THE PUBLIC CIVIL ACTION
In 1985, Brazil enacted a statute that created a class action
called the public civil action. 126 Originally, the public civil action
could be brought for damages caused to the environment, consumers,
historic or artistic property or rights, and any other diffuse or collec-
tive rights. Subsequent legislation has extended its scope to include a
wide range of diffuse and collective interests, such as violations of the
laws protecting the economic order and popular economy, consumer
protection, the handicapped, investors in the capital market, chil-
dren, adolescents, the elderly, sports fans, and city planning. 127
There is, therefore, considerable overlap with the popular action, and
the two actions are sometimes filed together. But their aims are usu-
ally different. The popular action usually seeks to annul an act or
contract, while the public civil action normally seeks a damage rem-
edy or a remedy akin to a positive or negative injunction, namely that
the defendant be required either to do something or to cease doing
something.
121. Id. at art. 21.
122. Id. at art. 5 § 4, as amended by Law No. 6.513 of Dec. 20, 1977, art. 34.
123. MEIRELLES ET AL., supra note 77, at 160.
124. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5(LXXII), provides that any citizen may
bring a popular action to annul an act injurious to the public patrimony, administra-
tive morality, the environment, and to historic cultural patrimony.
125. Law No. 4.717 of June 29, 1965, art. 18.
126. Law No. 7.347 of July 24, 1985, as amended.
127. Id. at 184. MEIRELLES ET AL., supra note 77, at 184.
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The Brazilian public civil action differs in many important ways
from the U.S. class action from which it was derived. First, individual
members of the class cannot represent it. Second, the public civil ac-
tion can only be brought by the Public Ministry, the Public Defender,
the Federal Government, any state or municipal government, any
governmental entity, foundation, or mixed-capital company, or any
association, provided that its institutional purposes include protec-
tion of the diffuse or collective interests at stake and it has been in
existence for at least one year. 128 In practice, about ninety percent of
all class actions are brought by the Public Ministry. Third, if it does
not intervene in the action as a party, the Public Ministry must par-
ticipate in the proceedings as the guardian of the law. Fourth, if the
court awards a money judgment against the defendant, the award
does not go to the class members. Instead, the proceeds of the judg-
ment must be deposited in a Special Fund Account for Protection of
Diffuse Rights. The funds are then used to restore rights violated by
the defendant's conduct, often for funding research and educational
projects.129 Fifth, the general rule that the prevailing party recovers
costs and attorney's fees from the losing party is modified. On the one
hand, losing plaintiffs need not pay costs or the other side's attorney's
fees unless the action is brought in bad faith; on the other hand, if the
defendant loses, it must pay plaintiffs costs and attorney's fees.130
Sixth, class members are notified only by publication. Even if they
somehow manage to learn about the class action, they cannot opt out.
They are free, however, to bring individual actions if the class action
is unsuccessful, and, such individual actions can in fact go
forward. 3 1
The public civil action uses the procedure for an ordinary action
and is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The judge can issue a
preliminary injunction if requested in the complaint. Like the popu-
lar action, the judgment in a popular civil action has erga omnes
effect in the sense that it constitutes res judicata with respect to any
future class action unless there has been a failure of proof. But this
res judicata effect is limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the court
issuing the judgment.132.
Like the popular action, the public civil action will not lie to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of a law in the abstract. The public civil
action has been widely used to protect the environment and consum-
128. Law No. 7.347 of 1985, art. 5.
129. Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51
Am. J. Comp. L. 311, 339-40 (2003). This is not true for consumer protection suits,
where successful plaintiffs can recover individualized damages.
130. Id. at 340.
131. ANToNo GIDI, RUMO A UM CODIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO: A CODIFICA(QAO
DAS AQOES COLETIVAS NO BRASIL 287-94 (2008).
132. Law No. 7.347 of 1985, art. 16.
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ers, and it is starting to be used to protect investors. Unfortunately, it
cannot be invoked where it is most needed: to challenge the lawful-
ness of taxes, social security matters, the Fund for the Guarantee of
Time of Service or other funds with named individual
beneficiaries. 133
VIII. MAKING INTER PARTES DECISIONS BINDING ERGA OMNES
All six of the constitutional actions discussed above constitute
parts of the system of incidental judicial review, and the decisions
rendered in these cases normally have no binding effects beyond the
parties. Nevertheless, unlike most other civil law countries, Brazil
has developed four unique institutions designed to convert inter
partes decisions into binding precedents.
A. Senate Suspension
The 1934 Constitution created a novel device for converting cer-
tain constitutional decisions of the STF into decisions that are
binding erga omnes.13 4 This device, which is now embodied in Article
52(X) of the 1988 Constitution, grants the Federal Senate exclusive
power "to suspend enforcement, in whole or in part, of laws declared
unconstitutional by final decision of the Supreme Federal Tribunal."
Whenever the STF has definitively determined that a federal, state
or municipal law or norm is unconstitutional in a concrete case (dif-
fuse or incidental judicial review), the President of the Tribunal
sends a copy of the decision to the Federal Senate. The Senate then
has the power to adopt a resolution suspending enforcement of the
unconstitutional norm.135 Normally, the Senate issues the requested
suspensory resolution.' 3 6 This neither repeals nor annuls the norm;
it simply makes it unenforceable against anyone as of the date of
133. Id. art. 1, sole paragraph.
134. CONST. OF 1934, art. 91(IV).
135. Nelson Nery Junior, 0 Senado Federal e o Controle Concreto de Constitucion-
alidade de Leis e Atos Normativos: Separagdo de Poderes, Poder Legislativo e
Interpretagdo da CF 52X, 47 REV. INFORM. LEGIS. 193, 194 (No. 187, Jy. /Sept. 2010).
There is, however, some doctrinal support for the position that the Senate is required
to suspend a norm definitively declared unconstitutional by the STF. Id. at 196, n.2;
REGINA MARIA MACEDO NERY FERRARI, EFEITOS DA DECLARAQAO DE INCONSTITUCION-
ALIDADE 201-04 (5th ed. 2004).
136. When the Senate refuses to suspend the unconstitutional norm, there is usu-
ally a rational explanation. For example, the Senate refused to suspend a federal
statute requiring taxpayers to make contributions to the Fund for Social Investment
(FINSOCIAL) because the STF's vote was only 6 to 5, and because suspending this
revenue measure would create a serious dent in federal finances. RE 150.764-1, dis-
cussed in CL9VE, supra note 7, at 276.
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adoption of the Senate's resolution. Once it has suspended the law,
however, the Senate cannot revive it, either wholly or in part.137
Referral to the Federal Senate is unnecessary when the STF de-
clares a norm unconstitutional in an abstract direct action or creates
a sgmula vinculante (see Section C below) because such decisions au-
tomatically have erga omnes effect. Lately, there has been a doctrinal
debate as to whether abstract judicial review and the development of
binding precedents have turned the Senate referral device into an
anachronism.138
B. The Sdimula
In 1964, the STF created a form of judicial precedent called the
samula (derived from the Latin noun summula, meaning little sum-
mary). The slimula is a collection of hundreds of capsulated rules of
law that have become firmly settled by decisions of the STF. These
numbered black letter rules are almost always only one sentence
long, taken from the head notes to the STF's own decisions. Unlike
common law precedents, however, these civil law precedents float
freely from the facts of the cases in which they were determined.
Rules are placed in the sgmula only after the case law has become
firmly established through a series of decisions, either through en
banc uniformization or through a line of cases adopting a particular
position.
The 1973 Code of Civil Procedure formally ensconced the sdmula
in positive law and assured that the other appellate courts would
adopt their own sdmulas. Article 479 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that "a judgment rendered by a vote of an absolute majority
of a tribunal's members shall be the object of the simula and shall
constitute a precedent for making the case law uniform." The sole
paragraph of Article 479 directs each appellate tribunal to provide in
its internal rules for the publication of its own simula. If the lower
court denies a request to file a special appeal to the STJ or an ex-
traordinary appeal to the STF, that decision can still be appealed to
the STJ or STF by a bill of review. If, however, the appealed decision
conflicts with a slimula or predominant case law of the STJ, Article
544 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Law No. 9.756 of
December 17, 1998) authorizes the reporter, acting alone, to convert
the bill of review into a special or extraordinary appeal and to adjudi-
cate the merits. Article 557 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as
amended by Law No. 9.756 of December 17, 1998) also gives the re-
137. RMS No. 16.512 (STF, Rep. Oswaldo Trigueiro), 38 R.T.J. 5 (1966), translated
in KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
119-24 (1975).
138. Compare MENDES ET AL., supra note 5, at 1090, with Nelson Nery Junior,
supra note 135.
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porter, acting alone, the power to deny an appeal that conflicts with
the samula or predominant case law of the STF or STJ or to grant an
appeal against a decision that conflicts with the sdmula or predomi-
nant case law of the STF or STJ.1a9
According to the Internal Rules of the STF, rules contained in its
samula can be adopted, modified or repealed only by vote of an abso-
lute majority of the full Tribunal.140 The Internal Rules of the STJ
state that its Samula shall consist of decisions made by an absolute
majority of the Special Court or one of the Sections in a procedure to
make the case law uniform, as well as unanimous decisions of the
Special Court or its Sections, or by an absolute majority in at least
two concordant judgments. Modification or revocation of a sdimula re-
quires the vote of an absolute majority of the Special Court or its
Sections, with a minimum of two-thirds of its members present.141
The most recent samula of the STF is numbered 736 and was added
in November 2003. The STJ, which has been in existence only since
1988, has been creating samulas more rapidly than the STF. Its most
recent samula is numbered 471 and was promulgated on February
23, 2011. Moreover, the number of samulas actually in force today in
the STF is fewer than 736 because some have been overruled, modi-
fied, or rendered obsolete, although the numeration remains the
same.142 Normal practice is for the STF and STJ to dispose of appeals
presenting the same legal issue summarily by simply citing to their
szimulas. While technically the lower courts are not bound to follow a
samula, disregard of a slimula virtually ensures an automatic
reversal.
C. Binding Precedent (Sdmula Vinculante)
Constitutional Amendment No. 45 of 2004, known as the Judicial
Reform Amendment, substantially reformed the Judiciary. One of the
reforms was to permit the STF to create binding precedents in cases
of incidental judicial review. The Amendment added to the Constitu-
tion a new article, which provides that after reiterated decisions on
constitutional matters, the STF may, ex-officio or upon request, ap-
139. In both bills of review and appeals, the reporter's decision can be appealed by
bill of review to a panel of the STF or STJ Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 545 and 557
§ 1.
140. Regimento Interno do STF, art. 102 § 1 (2010).
141. Id., arts. 122 §§ 1 and 2, and 125 § 3.
142. At least thirty-six of the STF's simulas have been revoked or cancelled. Some
have been revoked by the 1988 Constitution or subsequent legislation, some refer to
the prior constitution or interpret legislation no longer in force, some have been can-
celled by a later decision of the STF, and one has been effectively overturned by a
later inconsistent sdmula of the STJ. A complete list of the sdmulas of the STF and
the STJ can be found on their websites with citations to the cases upon the rules are
based: http://www.stf.jus.br/ and http://www.stjjus.br/.
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prove a binding precedent (sdmula vinculante).143 Like the
nonbinding sdmulas, binding precedents are short capsulated black
letter rules of law floating freely from the facts of the cases upon
which they are based. These precedents are binding not only upon the
entire judiciary, but also upon the federal, state, and county public
administration.
The STF can create a binding precedent only with the concur-
rence of at least two-thirds of its members sitting en banc.
Amendment 45 authorized the STF to create a binding precedent ei-
ther ex officio or upon request by a person with standing to bring a
direct action of unconstitutionality. 144 The implementing legislation
has expanded standing to propose issuance, revision or revocation of
binding precedents to include Superior Tribunals; the Tribunals of
Justice of the States, Territories, and the Federal District; Federal
Regional Tribunals, Regional Labor Tribunals; Regional Electoral
Tribunals; and Military Tribunals.145 In addition, a county may also
have standing to propose issuance, revision or revocation of a binding
precedent, but only incidentally, i.e., in the course of litigation in
which it is a party. 46
Binding precedents have immediate effects. By a two-thirds vote,
however, the STF can restrict its effects or decide that the precedent
shall go into effect at a later time.' 4 7 If any administrative act or judi-
cial decision contravenes or fails to apply a sdmula vinculante
properly, a special appeal, called a reclamation, may be filed with the
STF. If it grants the reclamation, the STF will annul the act or vacate
the decision and determine what should be instituted in its place.148
The STF has been in no hurry to create sdmulas vinculantes. The
first binding precedent was not created until mid-2007. Since then,
the STF has issued only thirty-two simulas vinculantes. One of
these, Simula Vinculante No. 13, has been highly controversial be-
cause the STF bent the rules on creating binding precedents to fill a
legislative vacuum. One day before issuing its binding precedent, the
STF decided a declaratory action brought by the Association of Bra-
zilian Magistrates with respect to the constitutionality of a resolution
adopted in 2005 by the National Council of Justice.149 This resolution
prohibited the much abused practice of nepotism in staffing positions
within the federal and state judiciaries. It was attacked as a violation
of the principle of separation of powers by invading the province of
143. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 103A.
144. Constitutional Amendment 45 of Dec. 30, 2004, art. 2 § 2.
145. Law No. 11.417 of Dec. 19, 2006, art. 3(XI).
146. Id. at art. 3(XI) § 1.
147. Id. at art. 3(XI) § 4.
148. Id. at art. 7 § 2. A reclamation against an omission or act of the public admin-
istration can be granted only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. at art. 7
§ 1.
149. National Council of Justice, Resolution No. 7 of Oct. 18, 2005.
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the legislature, as well as on federalism grounds because a federal
entity was regulating the conduct of state judiciaries. In sustaining
the constitutionality of the Council of Justice's Resolution, the STF
relied upon the heading to Article 37 of the Constitution, which pro-
vides: "The direct or indirect public administration of any of the
Branches of the Union, States, Federal District and Counties, shall
obey the principles of legality, impersonality, morality, publicity and
efficiency .. .. "1o The very next day, the STF filled a legislative vac-
uum on its own by issuing a samula vinculante extending the
National Council of Justice's prohibition of nepotism in the Judiciary
to ban nepotism in all branches of the federal, state and county gov-
ernments, including all direct and indirect public administration. The
STF also banned so-called "crossed nepotism," a creative Brazilian
nepotism bypass where officials reciprocally employ each other's rela-
tives.' 5 1 Lacking an established line of precedents for this novel
proposition, the STF cited several of its prior decisions upholding
laws or state constitutional provisions banning nepotism, as well as
this direct action of constitutionality banning nepotism in the Judici-
ary. None of the cited precedents, however, constitute reiterated
decisions with respect to an identical constitutional question suited
to support the STF's legislative creation in Sdmula Vinculante No.
13.152 While banning of nepotism in all branches of Brazilian govern-
ment is undoubtedly a desirable policy measure to increase
administrative probity and morality and to reduce corruption, this
legislative enactment by the STF does not fit comfortably with the
objective for creation of binding precedents. 53
D. General Repercussions
Historically, the STF has lacked a device similar to the U.S. Su-
preme Court's writ of certiorari to enable it to refuse to decide
unimportant cases. Since adoption of the 1988 Constitution, which
vastly expanded the number of constitutional rights and access to ju-
dicial review, the STF's caseload has become overwhelming,
150. ADC No. 12, Decision of Aug. 20, 2008, DJ Dec. 18, 2008 (STF Rep. Carlos
Britto).
151. Samula Vinculante No. 13 approved Aug. 21, 2008, DJ Aug. 29, 2008.
152. Anontion Moreira Mauds, Problemas sobre Sdmula l8 Culpa do Pr6prio STF,
CONSULTOR JURIDIco (July 3, 2010), available at http://www.conjur.com.br/2010-jul-
03/culpa-problemas-sumula-nepotismo-proprio-stf?im.
153. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 103-A § 1 provides:
The objective of a binding precedent shall be the validity, interpretation
and efficacy of determined norms, as to which there is presently controversy
among judicial bodies and the public administration, causing serious legal
insecurity and corresponding multiplication of cases about identical
questions.
1037
1038 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 59
exceeding 100,000 cases annually.15 4 In an attempt to provide the
STF with a functional analog to certiorari, the Judicial Reform
Amendment (Amendment 45 of 2004) created a new constitutional
limitation on extraordinary appeals called "general repercussions." 5 s
This screening device began to be implemented by the STF only on
May 3, 2007, the date it approved a change in its Internal Rules.' 56
Since then, the STF has required every litigant bringing an ex-
traordinary appeal to the STF to show that the appeal presents a
constitutional question with general repercussions as a prerequisite
to having the appeal heard by the Tribunal. Whether an appeal
presents general repercussions depends upon whether it presents ec-
onomic, political, social or juridical questions that extend beyond the
parameters of the specific case.15 7 Any appeal against a decision that
contravenes a siamula or the predominating case law of the STF is
conclusively deemed to present a general repercussion.15 8 While the
U.S. Supreme Court requires an affirmative vote of at least four
members to grant a writ of certiorari, the STF requires a negative
vote of at least eight of its members to deny an extraordinary appeal
because it lacks general repercussions.15 9 Unlike the writ of certio-
rari, which has no precedential value, the determination by the STF
that an appeal does not have general repercussions constitutes a
binding precedent with respect to all other appeals presenting identi-
cal issues.o6 0 The STF has also amended its Internal Rules to extend
154. The number of cases decided by the STF increased from 16,313 in 1988 to a
high of 159,522 in 2007. In 2010, the number of cases decided fell to 103,869: http://
www.stf.jus.br/.
155. The extraordinary appeal (recurso extraordindrio) is derived from the writ of
error of the U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789. The extraordinary appeal may be taken from
decisions of the sole or last instance that are contrary to the Constitution, declare a
treaty or federal law unconstitutional, upholds a law or act of local government chal-
lenged as unconstitutional, or upholds a local law challenged as conflicting with
federal law. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 102 (III) § 3, which was added to art.
102 by Amendment 45 of Dec. 8, 2004, provides:
In order for the Tribunal to examine the admissibility of an extraordinary
appeal, which may be rejected only by manifestation of two-thirds of its mem-
bers, the appellant must demonstrate the general repercussions of the
constitutional question argued in the case, as provided by law.
156. Emenda Regimental No. 21.
157. Code of Civil Procedure, art. 543-A § 1, as amended by Law No. 11.418 of Dec.
19, 2006.
158. Id. at art. 543-A § 3.
159. If, however, four members of a five member chamber of the STF decide that
an appeal presents general repercussions, that determination will be decisive, and
there will be no consideration of the issue by the full STF. Id. at art. 543-A § 4. On
Dec. 1, 2010, the STF amended art. 323 of its Internal Rules to permit the President
of the STF to act as reporter for all extraordinary appeals prior to the vote on general
repercussions, a vote that can be taken electronically in cases involving settled STF
case law. Noticias STF, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticias
Detalhe.asp?idConteudo= 167315&tip=UN.
160. Code of Civil Procedure, at art. 543-A § 5.
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the requirement of general repercussions to interlocutory appeals
presented by a bill of review (agravo de instrumento).16 1
The requirement of general repercussions has been instrumental
in reducing substantially the number of extraordinary appeals and
bills of review being heard by the Supreme Federal Tribunal. From
2007 to 2010, the number of extraordinary appeals distributed to the
STF fell by 86.4%, while the number of bills of review declined by
56.4%.162
These four procedural institutions have required qualification of
the proposition that decisions rendered by Brazilian courts in decen-
tralized judicial review affect only the parties. Brazil is clearly
moving towards creation of a civil law version of stare decisis upon
both direct and indirect review.
IX. ABSTRACT REVIEW AND THE DIRECT ACTION
OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Under prior Brazilian constitutions, the STF had original and ex-
clusive jurisdiction to decide an original action challenging in the
abstract the constitutionality of federal or state laws or normative
acts. This action was originally called a representation, and only the
Procurator General of the Republic had standing to bring it.163 The
1988 Constitution renamed the representation as the "direct action of
unconstitutionality" and significantly expanded the list of persons
with standing to bring it. In addition to the Procurator General, this
group of persons currently includes the President of the Republic, the
Executive Committee of either house of Congress, the Executive
Committee of the legislature of any state or the legislative chamber of
the Federal District, the Governor of any state or the Federal Dis-
trict, the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association, any
161. Emenda Regimental No. 24 of May 8, 2008; Emenda Regimental No. 27 of
Nov. 28, 2008. Law No. 12.322 of Sept. 9, 2010, transformed a bill of review taken
from a decision refusing to permit an extraordinary appeal from a separate appeal
into a procedure that permits appellate review on the same record. The STF has cre-
ated a new classification for such appeals, called an extraordinary appeal with a bill
of review (recurso extraordindrio corn agravo-aRE). Noticias STF, Dec. 1, 2010, http://
www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiasDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=167315&tip=UN.
162. The number of extraordinary appeals distributed fell from 49,708 in 2007, to
21,531 in 2008, to 8,348 in 2009, and to 6,735 in 2010. The number of bills of review
fell from 56,909 in 2007 to 37,783 in 2008, to 24,301 in 2009, and to 24,801 in 2010.
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=estatistica&pagina=
REAIProcesso.
163. No matter how blatant the unconstitutionality of a statute, no one could com-
pel the Procurator General to bring a reclamation if he did not wish to do so. See
Reclamaqio No. 849 (Mar. 10, 1971), 59 R.T.J. 333 (STF en banc, Rep. Adalfcio
Nogueira). Under prior Constitutions, the President could dismiss the Procurator
General at will. Under the present Constitution, the Procurator General, who must be
a career member of the Public Ministry, is appointed for a two-year term by the Presi-
dent, who can remove him only with the consent of an absolute majority of the Senate.
CONsr. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 128 §§ 1 and 2.
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political party represented in the Federal Congress, and any syndical
confederation or national class entity.164
In direct actions of unconstitutionality, the STF decides the con-
stitutionality of a challenged law or normative act in the abstract.
The legislation must already be in force. Unlike countries that follow
the model of the French Constitutional Council, Brazil has no antici-
patory or preventive judicial review with the exception of writ of
security actions by members of Congress to challenge proposed con-
stitutional amendments. 65 The STF has refused to permit any form
of direct action to test the constitutionality of draft legislation. 166
Technically, there are no adverse parties in the direct action of un-
constitutionality, and third parties cannot intervene.' 67 The
plaintiffs have a right to be heard, and the Procurator General must
take a position before the Tribunal. While the Procurator General is
free to support or oppose the action, the Advocate General of the
Union must defend the constitutionality of the challenged law or
act.168 The STF has borrowed a page from the U.S. courts by allowing
the filing of amicus curiae briefs, and a page from the German Con-
stitutional Court by holding public hearings before deciding
particularly controversial constitutional challenges.'69
The STF sits en banc rather than in panels in all direct actions of
unconstitutionality, and a minimum of eight ministers is required to
vote on any such action. A minimum of six votes is required to declare
a statute unconstitutional in a direct action.170 A direct action can be
summarily dismissed if the reporter to whom the action is assigned
determines that the action is frivolous.' 7 '
The STF may issue provisional remedies, such as a preliminary
injunction, in direct actions of unconstitutionality. Unless the Tribu-
nal is in recess, such remedies can be issued only by an absolute
majority of the entire Tribunal. These provisional remedies have erga
omnes effects and usually operate only prospectively, but the STF has
the power to make them retroactive.172 Governmental officials
charged with enforcing the challenged rule normally have five days to
respond before issuance of a provisional remedy, but in cases of ex-
164. Id. at art. 103 (I)-(IX).
165. See supra note 10.
166. ADI No. 466-DF (STF, Apr. 3, 1991, Rep. Celso de Mello), DJU of May 10,
1991.
167. Law No. 9.868 of Nov. 10, 1999, art. 7.
168. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 103 § 3.
169. Law No. 9.868 of 1999, art. 7 § 2 authorizes the reporter to permit manifesta-
tions by other organs and entities, considering the relevance of the matter and the
representativeness of the advocates. This has provided the basis for acceptance of
amicus curiae briefs and expert testimony. See MENDES ET AL., supra note 5, at 1124.
170. Law No. 9.868 of 1999, art. 23; STF Regimento Interno, arts. 143 and 173.
171. Law No. 9.868 of 1999, art. 4. This dismissal may be appealed to the full
Tribunal.
172. Id. at arts. 10-12.
1040 [V01. 59
20111 PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN BRAZIL
ceptional urgency the STF can act immediately. The reporting judge
normally hears from the Procurator General and the Advocate Gen-
eral within fifteen days. In cases of special significance to the social
order and legal security, the reporter can speed up the process by
submitting the action directly to the full Tribunal. In this case the
Advocate General and the Procurator General must submit their po-
sitions within five days. 173
The direct action of unconstitutionality is by far the most numer-
ous of the four types of direct constitutional actions. Since inception
in 1988 and May 31, 2011, 4,554 direct actions of unconstitutionality
have been filed in the STF. The STF has reached a final decision in
only 3,011 of the 4,554 direct actions on its docket. Slightly more than
31% of the direct actions have been successful, either in whole (739)
or in part (198). The STF has issued a preliminary injunction, either
in whole (223) or in part (67), in only about 8% of the 1,113 pending
direct actions. Approximately 7.8% of the direct actions were dis-
missed for lack of standing. 174 Syndical confederations and unions
initiated 1,105 direct actions deemed to have standing, more than
any other group. State Governors were in second place with 1,098,
followed by the Procurator General with 932, political parties with
797, the Federal Council of the Bar Association with 199, the Execu-
tive Committees of state legislatures with 52, the President of the
Republic with eight, only one by the Executive Committee of the Fed-
eral Senate, and none by the Executive Committee of the Federal
Chamber of Deputies. 175
With a few very important exceptions, most of the direct actions
of unconstitutionality have dealt with fairly narrow and parochial
questions. Many are disposed of on narrow technical grounds. Never-
theless, the direct action is a useful device for political parties who
have lost in Congress, particularly if they are able to persuade the
Tribunal to issue a preliminary injunction, which provides them with
important leverage. Merely threatening a direct action of unconstitu-
173. Id. art. 12.
174. The great bulk of those dismissed for lack of standing were brought by groups
failing the STF's test of thematic relevancy, which insists upon an objective link be-
tween the plaintiffs institutional duties and the challenged statute. This requirement
is not utilized for direct actions brought by the Procurator General, the Bar Council,
and political parties, all of which are deemed to have a generalized interest in consti-
tutional government. Carlos Antonio de Almeida Melo, Algumas Questaes Objetivas
sobre Aqdo Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, 36 REV. INFORM. LEGIS. 111, 117-18 (No.
142m Apr./Je. 1999).
175. Agbes Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade por Legitimado-1988 a 2011, avail-
able at http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=estatistica&pagina=adi
Legitimado.
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tionality may inspire the majority to negotiate seriously with the
smaller parties. 176
X. THE DECLARATORY ACTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The declaratory action of constitutionality was created by Consti-
tutional Amendment No. 3 in 1993. It confers upon the STF the
exclusive power to hear "actions declaring the constitutionality of fed-
eral laws or normative acts." Although it appears to be redundant
with the direct action of unconstitutionality, this is not the case. The
declaratory action of constitutionality was created to allow the fed-
eral government to resolve sensitive issues involving the
constitutionality of federal law quickly and authoritatively in the
STF. When Brazil embarked upon a privatization program during
the early 1990s, the world was treated to a judicial circus in which
opponents of privatization managed to secure preliminary injunc-
tions from lower courts located all over the country to block the
auctions. As Professor Arnoldo Wald explained, the basic purpose of
the declaratory action "is to avoid delay and contradictions with re-
spect to constitutional questions of highest importance, which if not
resolved rapidly, might lead to true legal chaos, prejudicing the na-
tional economy and the very development of the country."177
Initially, there were three important differences between the de-
claratory action and the direct action of unconstitutionality. Between
1993 and 2004, standing to bring the declaratory action was re-
stricted to three types of federal officials: (1) the President of the
Republic, (2) the Executive Committee of either house of Congress, or
(3) the Procurator General. Article 1 of Constitutional Amendment
No. 45 of 2004 eliminated this difference and expanded those with
standing to bring a declaratory action of constitutionality to the same
group of persons entitled to bring the direct action of unconstitution-
ality. The second difference is that a declaratory action can be
brought only with respect to federal laws and normative acts. It may
not be used for state and county legislation. The third difference is
that the declaratory action is available only if there is a judicial con-
troversy with respect to the law or act that is involved. 178 This means
that the complaint must show judicial decisions questioning the con-
stitutionality of the federal law or act at issue rather than purely
doctrinal disputes.179
176. Inocncia Martieres Coelho, Constitucionalidade/Inconstitucionalidade: uma
Questdo Politica, REV. JURIDICA VIRTUAL, No. 13 (Je. 2000) at http://
www.planato.gov.br/ccivil_03/revista/Rev-13/ques-politica.htm.
177. Arnoldo Wald, Alguns Aspectos da Aqdo Declarat6ria de Constitucionalidade,
76 REV. PROCEsso 7, 8-9 (Oct.-Dec. 1994).
178. Law No. 9.868 of 1999, art. 14(111).
179. MENDES ET AL., supra note 5, at 1131-32.
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Procedures are similar for both the direct action and the declara-
tory action. Both the Procurator General and the Advocate General
must be heard, and amicus curiae briefs can be considered. Abso-
lutely critical to the declaratory action is that the STF has the power
to enjoin ongoing proceedings involving application of the norm
whose constitutionality it is considering. 80
The first declaratory action involved the constitutionality of the
amendment that created it. In a prior direct action of unconstitution-
ality, the Association of Brazilian Magistrates contended that the
declaratory action was unconstitutional because it suppressed the
creativity of judges and violated fundamental guarantees to judicial
access, due process, full defense, and the adversary system, as well as
the separation of powers by making the STF a consultative organ for
the Congress. Even though this action was dismissed for lack of
standing, the STF responded seriously to those contentions in the
first declaratory action it decided. This was a case in which the Presi-
dent and the Executive Committee of the Congress sought a
declaration that a social security tax was constitutional. In a divided
vote, the STF held that the declaratory action of constitutionality was
itself constitutional.181
The declaratory action has been little used. In the eighteen years
since its creation, only thirty declaratory actions have been filed
before the STF, which has decided only seventeen of them. Only
seven of these declaratory actions have been successful, in whole (6)
or in part (1), and in only two of the seven pending actions has the
STF granted a provisional injunction.182 The declaratory action has
served, however, as an important device in the government's efforts
to avert a 1998 fiscal crisis, caused by lower courts conceding expen-
sive salary increases to civil servants through a recently created
procedural institution called tutela anticipada, a form of provisional
relief. In a declaratory action brought by the President of the Repub-
lic and the Executive Committees of both houses of Congress, the
STF issued a provisional injunction that prohibited all courts in the
country from granting anticipatory salary increases to civil servants
based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of Law No. 9.494 of
1997.183 That preliminary injunction, issued in 1998, was critical be-
cause it was not until 2008 that the STF eventually declared the
contested statute constitutional. 184
180. Id. at 1138.
181. ADC No. 1, 157 R.T.J. 371 (Rep. Moreira Alves, STF 1993).
182. Aqdes Declarat6rias de Constitucionalidade-1993 a 2011[through May 31,
20111, available at http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=estatistica&
pagina=adc.
183. ADC No. 4, Decision of Feb. 11, 1998, DJ Feb. 13, 1998 (Rep. Celso de Mello,
STF).
184. Id., Decision of Oct. 1, 2008, DJ Oct. 15, 2008.
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XI. ALLEGATION OF DISOBEDIENCE OF A FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPT
The 1988 Constitution created still another form of direct action
before the STF called an allegation of disobedience of a fundamental
precept.185 Because the constitutional language creating the action
calls for enactment of a complementary law, the STF refused to per-
mit utilization of this direct action until Congress passed such a
law.186 It took Congress a little more than eleven years to enact Law
9.882, the complementary law that implements the allegation of diso-
bedience of a fundamental precept.187 This statute makes the
standing requirements for bringing an action for disobedience of a
fundamental precept identical to those for bringing a direct action of
unconstitutionality or declaratory action of constitutionality.188 The
disobedience of a fundamental precept action will lie only if there is
no other effective remedy.' 89 Unlike the other direct actions to chal-
lenge constitutionality, the disobedience of a fundamental precept
action may be brought to contest the validity of a law or other norma-
tive act that predates the 1988 Constitution.190 This fills a lacuna left
by the case law of the STF holding that the direct action of unconsti-
tutionality cannot be used to challenge the validity of legislation that
predates the present Constitution.19 '
The regulatory law imposes a state action requirement, limiting
use of the disobedience of a fundamental precept to avoiding or re-
pairing injury to a fundamental precept resulting from a
governmental act. 192 As originally enacted, the regulatory law would
have created full scale anticipatory judicial review for the first time
in Brazilian history by allowing the action for disobedience of a fun-
damental precept to be used to annul proposed legislation. Such
provisions were removed by Presidential veto.193 As currently en-
acted, the regulatory law grants an absolute majority of the STF the
power to issue a provisional remedy suspending proceedings in any
case before the lower courts unless the matter is res judicata.194
185. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 102 § 1 provides: "Allegation of a disobedi-
ence of a fundamental precept stemming from this Constitution shall be heard by the
Supreme Federal Tribunal, as provided by law."
186. Dirley da Cunha Jilnior, Arguiqdo de Descumprimento de Preceito
Fundamanetal, in AQOES CONSTITUCIONAIS, supra note 44, at 491, 492, n.2.
187. Law No. 9.882 of Dec. 3, 1999.
188. Id. at art. 2. Art. 2(11) as originally enacted also conferred standing upon "any
person injured or threatened by an act of the Government." The President vetoed this
provision because of concern about the STF being swamped with direct actions
brought by individuals and its incompatibility with a system of abstract control of
constitutionality. "Razbes do Veto Presidencial," in MEIRELLES ET AL., supra note 77,
at 883, 885-86.
189. Law No. 9.882, art. 4 § 1.
190. Id. at art. 1(I).
191. ADI No. 2, (STF Feb. 6, 1992, Rep. Paulo Brossard), DJU Nov. 21, 1997.
192. Law No. 9.882 of 1999, at art. 1.
193. "Razdes do Veto Presidencial," supra note 188, at 883, 884-85.
194. Law No. 9.882 of 1999, art. 5 § 3.
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This innovative attempt to combine direct review with incidental
review was quickly challenged in a direct action of unconstitutional-
ity brought by the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association.
The Reporter in this case, Minister N6ri da Silveira, determined that
a constitutional amendment rather than a statute was required to
authorize this procedure and voted to grant a preliminary injunction
suspending the efficacy of this measure. Resolution of this case and
the efficacy of this preliminary injunction were interrupted by a re-
quest to review the record by Minister Pertence Septilveda, and as of
June 20, 2011, this case has not yet been decided by the STF. 195 Yet,
nearly four years later, in a subsequent disobedience of a fundamen-
tal principle action, the full STF issued a preliminary injunction
suspending all pending criminal actions involving abortion of a fetus
with anencephaly pending final decision of the STF on the merits.196
Moreover, in another subsequent disobedience of a fundamental prin-
ciple case, the STF rejected the argument of amicus curiae that the
undecided action for declaration of unconstitutionality against Law
9.882 of 1999 constituted a reason to suspend a disobedience of a fun-
damental precept action and stated that Law 9.882, including Article
5 § 3, was in full force.197 These subsequent decisions strongly indi-
cate that Minister N~ri da Silveira's position with respect to the
unconstitutionality of Article 5 § 3 of Law 9.882 has been implicitly
rejected by a majority of the STF.
At least two-thirds of the STF must be present to decide the mer-
its, and the STF can declare the law or normative act either
constitutional or unconstitutional. The decision of the STF in the dis-
obedience of a fundamental precept action is binding upon the entire
judiciary and government administration.
Neither the constitutional provision nor the implementing stat-
ute define what constitutes a fundamental precept. The STF has
adopted a case by case approach to determining what is a fundamen-
tal precept. According to the doctrine, fundamental precepts include
the individual rights guaranteed in the 78 subparagraphs of Article
5, the unchangeable provisions referred to in Article 60 § 4 (federal-
ism, periodic elections, separation of powers, and individual rights
and guarantees), and the constitutional principles referred to in Arti-
cle 34 whose breach authorizes the Federal Government to intervene
in the States or Federal District.198
195. ADI No. 2.231 (STF Dec. 5, 2001, vote of Rep. N6ri da Silveira), DJ of Dec. 17,
2001.
196. ADPF No. 54, decision of Apr. 27, 2005, D.J.U. Aug. 31, 2007 (STF en banc,
Rep. Marco Aurdlio). This case has yet to be decided on the merits.
197. APDF No. 33, Decision of Dec. 7, 2005, 199 R.T.J. 873, 877 (2007) (STF en
banc, Rep. Gilmar Mendes).
198. MENDES ET AL., supra note 5, at 1165.
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The action for disobedience of a fundamental precept has not
been much used, nor has it been very successful. As of May 31, 2011,
a total of only 227 disobedience of fundamental precept actions have
been distributed to before the STF. More than half of these actions
have been brought by syndical confederations and unions (65) and
political parties (64). Only four have granted in full on the merits,
and another two were partially granted. Provisional relief was ac-
corded in eight actions and denied in seven. The STF refused to hear
119 actions, and another 84 actions have yet to be decided. 99
Probably, the most celebrated successful action for disobedience
of a fundamental precept, which curiously was decided concurrently
with a direct action of unconstitutionality, interpreted Article 1723 of
the Civil Code to recognize a civil union between same sex persons
even though the text referred only to a union "between a man and
woman." The STF unanimously held Article III(IV) of the Constitu-
tion, which states that a fundamental objective of Brazil is "to
promote the well-being of all, without prejudice as to origin, race, sex,
color, age or any other forms of discrimination," is broad enough to
encompass discrimination on the basis of sexual preference, and that
the statute should therefore be read to include same sex unions. 200
The effect of this decision is to confer a broad range of benefits upon
same sex couples.
XII. ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY FOR OMISSION
The present Constitution confers original and exclusive jurisdic-
tion on the STF to hear actions for unconstitutionality for omission
whenever it determines the existence of the "lack of measures to
make a constitutional rule effective." 201 This action is the twin of the
mandate of injunction in direct review form, and it presents similar
problems. If the legislature has failed to adopt the needed implement-
ing legislation, the STF notifies Congress of its omission. If the
offender is an administrative agency, the STF may direct issuance of
the needed regulation within thirty days.
Congress finally regulated the action of unconstitutionality for
omission in 2009 by inserting a new chapter into the 1999 law that
regulates the direct action of unconstitutionality and the declaratory
199. Arguigdo de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental Distribuidas-1993 a
2011 (through May 31, 2011), available at http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.
asp?servico=estatistica&pagina=adpf.
200. ADPF 132 and ADI 4277 (STF en banc, May 5, 2011), Rep. Ayres Britto. ADI
4277 was originally protocoled as an action for disobedience of a fundamental precept,
ADPF 178. "Supreme reconhece uniio homoafetiva,"Noticias STF, May 5, 2011.
201. CONsT. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 103 § 2.
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action of constitutionality. 202 The standing requirements to bring the
action for omission are precisely the same as for the direct action of
unconstitutionality and declaratory action of unconstitutionality. 203
The procedures governing the direct action of unconstitutionality ap-
ply to the action for omission when they fit.2 0 4 The reporter can
request an opinion from the Advocate General. Unless he has brought
the action, the Procurator General has fifteen days to review the pro-
ceedings.205 If there is exceptional urgency and relevance, an
absolute majority of the full Tribunal can issue provisional measures,
which may consist of the suspension of the law in a case of a partial
omission. The provisional measure may also consist of suspension of
judicial or administrative proceedings, or any other measure that the
STF decides to impose. 206
One of the most notable actions for omission in which the STF
actually fashioned a remedy was an action brought by the Labor
Party (PT) because of Congress' failure to issue a constitutionally
mandated law that annually revised the salaries of federal govern-
ment employees. The STF awarded damages to the employees based
upon what they failed to earn had their salaries been adjusted by the
general price index.207
Not surprisingly, the action for omission has not worked well. It
is hard to know how many of such actions have been successful be-
cause until 2008, they were assigned the same classification as direct
actions of unconstitutionality. Between 2008 and May 31, 2011, the
STF has reached a final decision on only three actions for omission,
none of which were successful. Ten more await decision.208
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
Brazil has developed a complicated hybrid system of judicial re-
view that combines the centralized approach of European countries
with the decentralized approach of the United States. It has also de-
veloped a broad array of constitutionalized procedural devices to try
to turn constitutionally protected rights into reality. On paper, con-
stitutional rights are incredibly well protected, and adequate
procedural devices are in place for the judicial vindication of these
202. Law 12.063 of Oct. 27, 2009, inserted Chapter IIA into Law 9.868 of Nov. 10,
1999, in order to regulate specifically the direct action of unconstitutionality for
omission.
203. Id. at art. 12-A.
204. Id. at art. 12-E.
205. Id. at art. 12-E §§ 2 and 3.
206. Id. at art. 12-F.
207. ADI No. 2.061, Apr. 25, 2001, 179 R.T.J. 587 (2001) (STF en banc, Rep. Ilmar
Galvao).
208. Ag6es Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade por Omissdo-2 008 a 2011 [through
May 31, 2011], available at http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=es-
tatistica&pagina=ado.
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rights. Some constitutional rights are also well protected in practice;
for example, freedom of speech and freedom of religion are widely
respected. While there are still reports of threats and violence
against journalists, the biggest threat to freedom of the press appears
to come from the lower courts, which too often prohibit the media
from reporting on investigations of political corruption because of pri-
vacy concerns. 209 On the other hand, the STF has been actively
protecting press freedom. In 2009 the STF declared unconstitutional
the entire restrictive Press Law, enacted by the military regime in
1967, and in 2010 suspended a law prohibiting satire of political can-
didates during the Electoral campaign. 210 The right to health has
been judicially protected in a great many cases, 211 and Brazil has
long had one of the world's best programs of free medical care for
those suffering from HIV/AIDS.
Unfortunately, other constitutional rights, such as humane
treatment in prisons, freedom from torture, the right to education,
and the right to due process have not fared as well. Brazilian prisons
are badly overcrowded and plagued by inhumane treatment and vio-
lence. Although the 1988 Constitution explicitly prohibits torture and
makes commission of torture a non-bailable offense, 212 severe mis-
treatment of criminal detainees remains a widespread practice.
Extrajudicial killings by the police have been a chronic problem in
Brazil, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, and Sao Paulo.213 Il-
literacy rates are still high in Brazil, especially in the Northeast, and
there has relatively little success in the Brazilian courts with litiga-
tion seeking to enforce the constitutional right to education.214
Making paper rights a reality is only partly a task for the courts.
It is more importantly a task for all levels of governments. Ulti-
mately, what is required is a change in the culture of the elite with
respect to the underprivileged and the marginalized.
209. U.S. Dept. of State, 2010 Human Rights Report: Brazil (Apr. 8, 2011), p. 8
[hereinafter 2010 Human Rts. Rep.], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2010/wha/154496.htm.
210. ADPF 130, STF en banc, Decision of Apr. 30, 2009 (Rep. Ayres Britto). In
addition, in August 2010, the STF suspended a law prohibiting satire of political can-
didates. ADI 4.451, Sept. 2, 2010 (STF en banc, Rep. Ayres Britto).
211. Florian F. Hoffmann & Fernando R.N.M. Bentes, Accountability for Social
and Economic Rights in Brazil, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 100, 116-20 (Varun
Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008).
212. CONST. OF 1988, supra note 6, art. 5(111) and (XLII). Law No. 9.455 of Apr. 7,
1997, specifically criminalizes torture and Decree No. 40 of Feb. 15, 1991 promulgates
Brazil's adoption of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment and Practices.
213. DANIEL M. BRINKS, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO POLICE KILLINGS IN LATIN
AMERICA: INEQUALITY AND THE RULE OF LAw 45-47, 142-77, 223-41 (2008); 2010
Human Rts. Rep., supra note 210, at 1.
214. See Hoffman & Bentes, supra note 211.
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The 1988 Constitution has generated an enormous amount of lit-
igation that has overwhelmed the Brazilian courts. While the STF, in
contradistinction to most Brazilian courts, operates efficiently, man-
aging to dispose of more than 100,000 cases a year, some of the most
important and controversial constitutional questions, such as affirm-
ative action, therapeutic abortion, and the constitutionality of a
constitutional amendment adopted in 2000 that allows governmental
entities to pay final judgments against them over a ten-year period
have been sitting in the STF for many years without a final decision.
The recent effort to reduce caseloads through binding precedents has
not borne much fruit; however, the requirement of general repercus-
sions as a device to curtail the number of appeals is starting to
significantly reduce the exorbitant caseloads of the STF. The develop-
ment of class actions is another step in the right direction. But the
problem of long litigation delays still persists, along with the problem
of inadequate representation of the poor and the indigent.
To further reduce the caseloads of Brazil's two highest courts, the
current President of the STF, Cezar Peluso, has recently proposed
adoption of a constitutional amendment that will allow execution of
judgments even when they are subject to a special or extraordinary
appeal. Noting that only about fifteen percent of such appeals to the
Superior Tribunal of Justice and the STF are successful, Minister Pe-
luso concludes that most are taken to delay execution of the
judgment. By removing this incentive, the proposed amendment
should sharply reduce the number of special and extraordinary ap-
peals. Minister Peluso contends that adoption of his proposed
amendment may make it possible to execute judgments ten to fifteen
years earlier in many cases.215 This proposal has much to commend it
and should be adopted.
The expansive array of rights protected by the Constitution, and
the broad arsenal of constitutional remedies created to insure judicial
enforcement have often forced the Brazilian courts into the political
thicket without the ability to duck highly charged political questions.
In a number of high profile cases, the STF has been overtly acting as
a quasi-legislature and resolving an array of economic and political
questions.216 The 1988 Constitution has forced the STF to become an
activist court. This is partly because the Constitution attempts to cir-
cumscribe executive and legislative authority by constitutionalizing a
215. "PEC dos Recursos" 6 apresentada pelo presidente do STF e estard no III
Pacto Republicano, Noticias STF, Mar. 21, 2011.
216. See MATTHEW M. TAYLOR, JUDGING POLICY: COURTS AND POLICY REFORM IN
DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL (2008); Oscar Vilhena Vieira, Supremocracia, 4 REV. DE DIREITO
441 (No. 2, Jy.-Dec. 2008). Marcos Paulo Verissimo, A Constituigdo de 1988, Vinte
Anos Depois: Suprema Corte e Ativismo Judicial "a Brasileira," 4 REV. DE DIREITo GV
407 (No. 2, Jy.-Dec. 2008); Diana Kapiszewski, Power Broker, Policy Maker, or Rights
Protector? The Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal in Transition, in CouRTs IN LATIN
AMERICA 154 (Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa eds., 2011).
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great many economic and social policy decisions. It also is because the
framers of the Constitution intended to empower the STF as the
guardian of the Constitution's structural constraints and the protec-
tor of a myriad of individual and group rights. As a result, the STF
has been forced to determine how budgets should be allocated,
whether wage increases for civil servants are required or permitted,
whether presidents can reissue provisional measures that have the
force of law for limited periods if Congress fails to ratify them,
whether social security reform can have retroactive effects, or
whether the Law of the Clean Slate can be applied to the current
year's elections. Making these kinds of decisions has been a source of
on going tensions with the political authorities and always creates a
danger of political backlash. 217 In the meantime, however, Brazil's
federal courts have been playing a vital role in insuring that the con-
straints upon government set out in the 1988 Constitution are not
merely words on paper.
217. The Judicial Reform Constitutional Amendment, adopted in December 2004,
was a political manifestation of a widely felt need to make the Judiciary both more
accountable and more efficient.
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